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1. General introduction 
—“To an economist, a contract is an agreement under which two parties 
make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior – a bilateral 
coordination arrangement.” (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002: 3) 
—“Trade does exist, even in stateless societies.” (North, 1990: 54) 
1.1 The economics of contracts 
Contracts are important means of vertical coordination and exchange. Economic interac-
tion between two parties can be organized along a continuum of different vertical coordi-
nation mechanisms. On one end, there are anonymous spot markets that barely allow for 
relationship-specific investment, quality control or long-term adjustments. On the other 
end of the spectrum, there is complete vertical integration in the sense of Coase’s (1937) 
firm, which is often rigid and inefficient. The use of contracts as an intermediate form can 
combine advantages of these extreme modes of economic governance, yet is associated 
with a number of pitfalls and new challenges. 
The rise of new institutional economics has also augmented economists’ interest in con-
tractual relationships—may this interest be theoretical or empirical in nature. In the early 
1970s, contract or information economics emerged; the prevailing Walrasian market theo-
ry, which analyzes the equilibration of demand and supply only through prices, seemed not 
appropriate for the study of outside-of-equilibrium exchange and bilateral relations (Brous-
seau and Glachant, 2002; Salanié, 2005). These relations are typically characterized by a 
fundamental transformation (Williamson, 1985) from a competitive market with many 
agents to a “bilateral monopoly” where relationship-specific investments are made. 
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Today, a great variety of issues are analyzed under the perspective of contract theory or the 
economics of contracts (cf. Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005; Brousseau and Glachant, 2002; 
Salanié, 2005): Incentives, information (or the absence of the same), transaction costs, 
trust, incomplete contracts and reference points as well as their direct or indirect results, 
namely, moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-ups and other forms of opportunistic behav-
ior. The range of analysis is wide because contracts are embedded in a world of institution-
al failures, boundedly rational agents, imperfect information and an unforeseeable future. 
Following Brousseau and Glachant (2002), we can identify three theoretical streams that 
jointly (albeit sometimes incompatibly) contribute to the economics of contracts. A brief 
sketch of these streams will facilitate an easier integration of the dissertation’s chapters 
into the economic literature. 
First, incentive theory typically uses the principal–agent paradigm for analytical purposes.
1
 
Hereby, a usually less informed party (principal) makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer 
to a better informed party (agent) who carries out an activity that—deterministically or 
stochastically—affects the principal’s profit. The principal, thus, faces the problem of de-
signing a contract that convinces the agent to accept it (participation constraint) and, at the 
same time, provides the agent with sufficient incentives to choose an activity that is best 
for the principal (incentive compatibility constraint). 
The design of an efficient and adequate incentive scheme is often hampered by information 
asymmetries, either with regard to exogenous or endogenous variables in the agency mod-
el. The former may lead to problems of adverse selection, that is, the principal cannot ob-
serve whether the agent is of a competent/productive/honest or rather an incompe-
                                                 
1
 For general and easily accessible overviews of agency theory and information asymmetries refer to Arrow 
(1985), Sappington (1991), Milgrom and Roberts (1992) or Hart (1995) among others. A more technical and 
comprehensive analysis is provided by, e.g., Hart and Holmström (1987) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005). 
This paragraph on incentive theory is based on these analyses. 
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tent/lazy/unscrupulous type. The latter, again, might result in moral hazard. Here, the ac-
tion consciously taken by the agent within the contractual relation (e.g., time spent on the 
project or effort invested) is her private knowledge. As this action is costly, it is commonly 
appealing to the agent to shirk or withhold inputs. The principal can only, if at all, assess 
the final outcome of the agent’s work or production, which is a function of the chosen ac-
tion—but also of some random variable beyond the agent’s control. To provide incentives, 
a contract must link the agent’s payment to the final outcome and thus shift some of the 
risk to her. The drawback of this incentive scheme is that risk-averse agents want to insure 
their payment against bad outcomes and might shy away from signing such an agreement. 
This “insurance–incentive dilemma” is at the heart of agency and incentive theory. 
Note, however, that most real-world incentive problems do not fall precisely into one of 
these two theoretical categories. One example is the problem of hidden knowledge, some-
times referred to as post-contractual adverse selection (Arrow, 1985; Rasmusen, 2007). We 
will address hidden knowledge in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
Second, the theory of incomplete contracts is concerned with the complexity and unpre-
dictability of the future, which makes it impossible for contracting parties to write all con-
tingencies down.
2
 The most severe problem is that the future state of nature with regard to 
important variables (productivity, demand etc.) or either party’s actions (investments etc.) 
cannot be sufficiently described in the contract and thus not be verified and enforced by 
third parties. Hence, to some degree all agreements are left incomplete. 
In anticipation of this incompleteness, it would be optimal to allow for ex post renegotia-
tions. When knowing this ex ante, however, commitment problems arise and agents are 
                                                 
2
 This paragraph on incomplete contract theory is based on Hart and Holmström (1987), Brousseau and Gla-
chant (2002) as well as Aghion and Holden (2011). 
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encouraged to underinvest. It is worth mentioning here that these agents are mostly consid-
ered to be rational (albeit not so in Aghion and Holden, 2011). Contractual incompleteness 
is therefore not a result of cognitive constraints, but should rather be interpreted as inevita-
ble or the outcome of a cost–benefit analysis. 
As opposed to much of incentive or agency theory, information in this approach is as-
sumed to be complete and symmetric for both contracting parties. Yet, while the state of 
nature (upon occurrence) is observable to both agents, third-party institutions are explicitly 
imperfect in verifying it: “[I]t is the asymmetry of information between the parties on the 
one hand, and outsiders (such as the courts) on the other hand, which is the root of the 
problem” (Hart and Holmström, 1987: 134). 
A recent and interesting extension of the theory of incomplete contracts is the behavioral 
assumption that ex ante contracts are understood as reference points and both parties feel 
entitled to the best outcome the contract allows for (Hart and Moore, 2008; Fehr, Hart and 
Zehnder, 2011a). Leaving some terms flexible and permitting ex post renegotiations would 
consequently result in grievance, conflicts and potential welfare-reducing activities. We 
will return to that issue later in this dissertation. 
Third, transaction costs economics (TCE)—or “governance approach”—draws on pio-
neering work by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1979; 1985). Most of their arguments are 
well known and should not be outlined here extensively. Yet, this theory has produced 
some assumptions and predictions that are central to the present dissertation and hence will 
be introduced in brief. Similar to the theory of incomplete contracts, TCE recognizes that 
all contractual arrangements exhibit gaps, shortcomings and that the future is blurry. How-
ever, it is more radical in identifying the origin of these problems: Different from the above 
approaches, all actors are strictly boundedly rational. Therefore, contractual incomplete-
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ness is not merely a result of the impossibility to verify compliance, it is inherent to a very 
imperfect institutional framework (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002). 
Another behavioral assumption of TCE is the explicit existence of opportunism. That is, 
some agents are not just self-interested, they resort to “guile” (Williamson, 1979; ibid., 
1985). This includes criminal acts, but also the exploitation of information asymmetries. 
Different forms of opportunism were already mentioned in this introductory chapter and 
will loom large in the three main chapters of this dissertation: reneging on contractual 
commitments, shirking and moral hazard, false statements on the state of nature etc.
3
 A 
central problem is that even though not everyone behaves opportunistically, those who do 
are not identifiable ex ante—similar to the adverse selection issue in incentive theory. 
It has been widely understood that transaction costs are associated with almost all kinds of 
economic exchange, with the mere exception of very simple and simultaneous spot market 
transactions. The extent of these costs is strongly influenced by the institutional environ-
ment agents live in (e.g., the legal system or culture), but it also, in turn, influences the 
institutional arrangement they opt for (the governance structure, e.g., a certain type of con-
tract). TCE puts emphasis on the latter (Williamson, 1979; Klein, 2000).  
Because external institutions are assumed to be highly imperfect, the use of private mecha-
nisms for enforcing contracts, resolving disputes and providing information is explicitly 
suggested. This touches on the denotation of private ordering, a topic we will revisit many 
times in the upcoming chapters. We can summarize that TCE “tries to explain how trading 
partners choose, from the set of feasible institutional alternatives, the arrangement that pro-
tects their relationship-specific investments at the least cost” (Klein, 2000: 468). Therefore, 
the study of contracts in a comparative institutional fashion is at the heart of this approach. 
                                                 
3
 Although there are forms of ex ante opportunistic behavior, we only address post-contractual opportunism. 
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1.2 Market institutions and the means of contract enforcement 
The economics of contracts outlined in the previous section reveal that contractual rela-
tionships are prone to severe incentive problems, issues of verifying performance, bounded 
rationality and opportunism. In what follows, we will take a more empirical look at the 
problem of contract enforcement with a particular emphasis on developing countries. As 
shall become clear, enforcement mechanisms can be rooted in both the institutional envi-
ronment and specific institutional arrangements. 
Along with the micro view of institutions that Williamson and his followers take, a more 
macro-oriented and historical perspective developed in the last few decades, acknowledg-
ing that “institutions matter” for a country’s economic performance and prosperity (e.g., 
North, 1990; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2012). Be-
sides securing property rights, institutions are meant to support the enforcement of con-
tracts. The “legal centralism” tradition of economics emphasizes the critical role of public 
institutions and contract law for contract enforcement (e.g., Posner, 1998). While in many 
developed countries a judicial authority—actively or through its very existence—
contributes to high rates of investment, lending and anonymous trade, other states witness 
serious institutional failures and can hardly rely on formal means of enforcement.
4
 
One indicator for the efficiency of formal enforcement institutions is the time required to 
de facto enforce a contract. Based on data by the World Bank’s Doing Business Report
5
, 
Figure 1.1 depicts the average enforcement time of contracts in different regions of the 
world in 2003–2014. Two immediate lessons can be drawn from this diagram. First, there 
are large differences in efficiency between regions. In the more industrialized countries of 
                                                 
4
 For a recent systematic review on the link between contract enforcement and investment see Aboal, Noya 
and Rius (2014). 
5
 Data available on www.doingbusiness.org/data 
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Europe, Central Asia, East Asia and North America enforcement is comparatively fast. The 
judicial system in a second group of regions (Latin America, Middle East and North Afri-
ca, sub-Saharan Africa) needs considerably more time, whereas South Asia is a striking 
outlier with a duration of three years. This length is mainly driven by India and Bangladesh 
whose mean enforcement time exceeds 1,400 days. The second lesson from Figure 1.1 is 
that changes in efficiency seem sluggish and reforms need much time to have an impact. 
Yet, not only the efficiency measured in time matters for contractual parties, also the effec-
tiveness, costs and access to legal institutions are critical factors. An additional role when 
assessing institutional quality certainly plays corruption and bribing—elements Figure 1.1 
does not take into account. 
 
Figure 1.1:  Average time to enforce a contract in different regions  
Source: Own elaboration based on data available on www.doingbusiness.org/data 
The question now is what individuals and businesses that find themselves in a “stateless” 
society, coined by weak formal institutions, can do. As the short quote by Douglass North 
at the outset of this introductory chapter implies, economic activity exists also in regions 
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ment altogether. An immediate but general answer is: They can make use of alternative 
enforcement mechanisms and institutions. 
Fafchamps (1996) introduces a model of contract enforcement that considers different sorts 
of costs for the offender (see Section 2.3.2 for a more formal illustration). We can catego-
rize these costs in accordance with their support of first-, second- or third-party enforce-
ment. First-party enforcement imposes an “internal” punishment to the offender in the 
form of guilt feelings, regret and fairness concerns. The efficacy of these mechanisms 
strongly depends on the individual and prevailing societal norms (Platteau, 1994). Fur-
thermore, the aggrieved party can initiate some form of second-party enforcement or retal-
iation through harming the offender’s reputation or terminating the trade relationship. A 
key implication from this argument is that a good reputation and a beneficial long-term 
relation are assets and relationship-specific investments; they can thus act as deposit, safe-
guard or, as Williamson (1985) calls it, a “hostage”. All these potential costs and threats 
are inherent in the agreement and hence have the power to make it self-enforcing. Third-
party enforcement, by contrast, can be public or private in nature. If agents cannot revert to 
public institutions (at low cost), private institutions, such as merchant guilds (Greif, 
Milgrom and Weingast, 1994), traders’ coalitions (Greif, 1993) or mafias (Gambetta, 
1993), can prevail. Besides coercion, these institutions may provide information or take on 
coordinating tasks (McMillan and Woodruff, 2000). We will return to the topic of en-
forcement mechanisms and particularly to private ordering in Chapter 2. 
Within the last two decades, a strand of empirical literature on market institutions in low-
income countries and transition economies has emerged that provides insights into real-
world settings, business practices and behavior in environments with high degrees of am-
biguity and risk. The most extensive overview is perhaps Fafchamps’ (2004) analysis of 
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markets and bilateral trade relations in several African economies. One robust finding from 
this literature is that recourse to formal legal institutions is not the usual modus operandi in 
case of contractual disputes. Table 1.1 depicts some results by Bigsten et al. (2000) from 
the manufacturing sector in sub-Saharan Africa. In summary, surveyed firms frequently 
experience late or even non-payment by clients and (though somewhat less often) late de-
liveries or quality deficiencies by suppliers, but seek public-order dispute resolution by far 
less often than they use direct bargaining. Nonetheless, or possibly on these grounds, firms 
are satisfied with the outcome in 80 percent of cases and even continue to trade with about 
one in two breaching clients and the vast majority of suppliers. 
Table 1.1:  African firms’ contractual disputes with clients and suppliers from Bigsten et al. (2000) 
 
Fafchamps and Minten (2001) show how the lack of formal institutions in Madagascar 
leads to a “flea market economy”, where agents confine themselves to simple forms of 
exchange and trading partners they know in order to diminish transaction costs. McMillan 
and Woodruff (1999a; 1999b) find that for Vietnamese firms prior screening of contractual 
partners and renegotiations are more important methods of preventing and resolving dis-
putes with trading partners than engaging lawyers and courts. 
 With clients  With suppliers 
 No. obs. Total sample  No. obs. Total sample 
Incidence of disputes: 
  late payment/late delivery 













Conflict resolution method:        
  direct bargaining 
  private arbitration 
  police 
  lawyer 

























Outcome of dispute: 
  dispute settled 
  satisfied with outcome 

















Notes: Table adapted from Bigsten et al. (2000); total sample refers to all six African 
countries surveyed: Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
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These findings from “flea markets” and the manufacturing sector can also be extended to 
contract agriculture.
6
 Gow, Streeter and Swinnen (2000) and Gow and Swinnen (2001) 
demonstrate how private enforcement capital and relationship-specific investments by ag-
ribusiness firms can make contracts with smallholders self-enforcing when institutions are 
in transition. Moreover, courts are found to be rarely involved in developing countries’ 
agricultural supply chains and firms must find other ways to deter farmers from side-
selling (Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen, 2009). Having said this, Barrett et al. (2012) 
reveal that contract breach is a frequent issue affecting both sides, producer and buyer. 
Chapter 2 will be a case study of an experimental contract farming arrangement. 
Another important—and directly related—finding from this literature is that contracts can-
not be understood as rigid commitments, but exhibit a considerable degree of flexibility if 
circumstances so require (Bigsten et al., 2000; Fafchamps, 2004). Here, weak institutions 
coincide with information asymmetries, since conditions that may prevent one party from 
honoring its obligations are often not visible to the other. Flexible agreements can facilitate 
risk sharing and support exchange. To truly understand economic interaction in risky envi-
ronments, a more rigorous analysis of observed voluntary contract flexibility is needed. We 
will contribute to this in Chapter 3. 
1.3 Studying behavior in contractual relationships: a case for experimentation 
After introducing relevant theories and some empirical evidence with regard to the central 
themes of this thesis, this section aims to (1) argue why experimentation is a very expedi-
ent method to study contractual relationships and (2) give a brief review of the experi-
mental literature on contracts that is related to this dissertation. 
                                                 
6
 See Wu (2014) for a contract theoretical reflection and modelling of contract farming. 
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The two main advantages associated with (laboratory) experimentation are replicability 
and control (Davis and Holt, 1993). The latter is central to draw causal inferences by ma-
nipulating single variables of the decision environment while holding others constant. By 
this means, we can create a ceteris paribus environment in which it becomes possible to 
trace back changes in behavior, decisions or preferences to the variation of a specific factor 
and foreclosing confounding effects. Another important element of indirect control in ex-
periments is randomization (Friedman and Sunder, 1994). For instance, the problem of 
selection bias can be circumvented by assigning subjects in a random fashion to different 
roles or treatments within the experiment. Moreover, the fact that monetary payoffs are 
used and contingent on subjects’ decisions (and thus endogenous to the experiment) en-
genders “real” consequences of actions and also real emotions
7
 (Falk and Heckman, 2009).  
Experimentation is also, and in particular, advantageous for studying conduct within con-
tractual relationships. Let us borrow the example of gift-exchange experiments from Falk 
and Heckman (2009). In these controlled studies, an important assumption of the efficien-
cy-wage theory is tested, namely, whether an agent reciprocates a higher (“fairer”) fixed 
payment with choosing a higher effort level (that only benefits the principal). The results 
have critical implications also for real-world contracts and the creation of appropriate in-
centives within contractual relations. Yet, a “clean” investigation with observational data 
proves challenging if not impossible, since we can barely control other factors influencing 
an agent’s choice of effort (e.g., reputation considerations). While the identification of ef-
fort is central to this test, it appears impossible to measure/compare effort levels and effort 
costs in/between different naturally occurring situations. Along these lines, Just and 
                                                 
7
 An anecdote nicely illustrates this claim: After running a session of the experiment presented in Chapter 2 
of this dissertation, one outraged participant approached the experimenters and urged them to restrict other 
subjects’ “irrational” and “illogical” behavior in the game that apparently had harmed both the angry partici-
pant as well as the one blamed. Even though everyone knew they are attending an experiment and only a few 
euros were at stake, this participant felt seriously betrayed and reacted highly emotionally. 
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Wu (2009) argue that carefully designed experiments can solve identification problems 
associated with observational studies on contract theory. 
Testing theories is, however, only one purpose of economic experiments. Besides “speak-
ing to theorists”, researchers may be “searching for facts” or “whispering in the ears of 
princes” (Roth, 1995). The “searching for facts” intention refers to the study of observed 
anomalies that can hardly be explained by existing theories (Croson, 2002). These anoma-
lies or regularities usually stem from other empirical or experimental research. “Whisper-
ing in the ears of princes” combines all experiments that aim to inform policy makers. This 
includes studies that test-bed new or reformed institutions or resemble a “wind tunnel” to 
examine policy interventions (ibid.; Croson and Gächter, 2010). Usually, research of this 
latter category uses more context or a specific framing, as opposed to experiments investi-
gating theoretical predictions, or is conducted in the field (as external validity is essential). 
Famous examples are randomized control trials (RCTs) that evaluate the impact of specific 
development programs in low-income countries (Banerjee and Duflo, 2009). 
Despite these advantages, we must acknowledge that experimentation in general, and la-
boratory experiments in particular (for a taxonomy cf. Harrison and List, 2004), are subject 
to criticism and have real limitations. We identified five general concerns that are recurring 
in the literature.
8
 First, most experiments are said to lack realism and external validity as 
their settings or games are very simplistic. Second, undergraduates or students in general 
are not representative and cannot replace experienced decision-makers as prevalent in 
many economic situations. Third, the money at stake is often trivial and, forth, the number 
of (independent) observations rather small. Last, the subject pools used for recruitment 
promote self-selection into experiments. There are many good responses to these five re-
                                                 
8 
These points of criticism and some responses can be found in Davis and Holt (1993), Croson (2002) and 
Falk and Heckman (2009) among others.
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proofs; we will return to them in Chapter 5. For now, we want to stress the advantages 
mentioned above—namely, control, resolution of identification problems, exogenous ma-
nipulation of the decision environment etc. All are critical for the study of contracts. 
What can we learn from existing experiments on contractual relations? In what follows, we 
will focus on seminal contributions that are closely linked to this dissertation and distinctly 
refer to contracts or use principal–agent settings. Even so, there are many revealed phe-
nomena that are relevant for our understanding of agreements, yet not outcome of explicit 
“contract experiments”: rejections in ultimatum games, trust and reciprocity in convention-
al investment games, altruistic punishment in cooperation games, to mention only a few. 
Many experimental studies on agency theory or gift-exchange games examine the exist-
ence of fairness and reciprocity as opposed to the standard self-interest model. Principal–
agent experiments run in the lab show that contract offers by and large obey norms of fair 
sharing, that is, agents benefit from a contract more than standard theory would predict 
(Keser and Willinger, 2000; ibid., 2007; Anderhub, Gächter and Königstein, 2002; Co-
chard and Willinger, 2005). Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) stress the importance of 
contracting parties’ reciprocal responses and show in different treatments that reciprocity is 
a powerful enforcement device. Relatedly, Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007) compare vari-
ous contract designs and find that agreements promising a bonus for the agent after per-
formance are superior to contracts threatening with punishment if some players are fair-
minded. Principals in general anticipate that fairness concerns can provide enforcement 
and opt for corresponding contract designs. 
Other studies look more specifically at relational contracting and reputation. Brown, Falk 
and Fehr (2004) allow for endogenous long-term relations and find that a lack of third-
party enforcement leads to a strong “bilateralisation” in markets. Similarly, these endoge-
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nous relationships appear to have a disciplining effect regarding debt repayment in credit 
markets (Fehr and Zehnder, 2009). Gächter and Falk (2002) show that agents’ positive 
reciprocity in a gift-exchange game is reinforced if players can build a bilateral reputation. 
Another recent strand of literature addresses the issues of renegotiation, hold-ups and ref-
erence points. Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) present evidence from lab experiments that even 
if ex post renegotiation cannot be ruled out, contracts may solve the hold-up problem and 
encourage investment. Several studies examine Hart and Moore’s (2008) hypothesis that a 
contract stipulates entitlements for the contracting parties’ ex post outcome (cf. Sec-
tions 1.1 and 3.1). Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2011a) confirm the existence of these entitle-
ments that have important consequences for contract design and can make flexible agree-
ments become inefficient. This analysis has been extended in Fehr, Zehnder and Hart 
(2009), Erlei and Reinhold (2010), Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2011b) as well as Bartling and 
Schmidt (2015). Brandts, Charness and Ellman (2012) find that free-form communication 
may considerably improve the outcome of flexible contracts. 
While field experiments on contracts are sparse in general
9
, some have been conducted by 
agricultural economists to better understand small-scale farmers’ behavior in contractual 
arrangements. Sänger, Torero and Qaim (2014) provide a random group of Vietnamese 
dairy farmers with the opportunity to externally verify their product’s quality before selling 
it to the purchasing company. They find that the removed information asymmetries have a 
significantly positive effect on smallholders’ quality investment, output and welfare. In a 
series of framed field experiments, again with contract farmers in Vietnam, Sänger et al. 
(2013) and Torero and Viceisza (2011) compare the virtue of different contract designs and 
third-party enforcement. The first study finds that contracts including penalty clauses for 
                                                 
9
 There are some related field experiments examining the effect of incentives in employment relations—e.g., 
Shearer (2004), Paarsch and Shearer (2009) as well as Kube, Maréchal and Puppe (2012). 
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low quality lead to a higher input use (and thus a higher quality outcome). Additional bo-
nus payments for recurring high-quality production further increases farmers’ purchase of 
inputs. Torero and Viceisza (2011) report gender-specific changes in trust following the 
introduction of a third-party auditor and potential collusion between auditor and trustee.  
1.4 Outline, research questions, and contribution of the dissertation 
This dissertation consists of three experimental studies on individuals’ behavior in contrac-
tual relationships. While each study in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 is subject to other research 
questions, they share specific characteristics and are thus closely related. First, all look at 
voluntary bilateral relations in which both trading partners can benefit from mutual trust 
and bona fide exchange. Nonetheless, all underlying games include for at least one party 
pecuniary incentives to defect. These design features seem natural and consistent with real-
world arrangements. Second, in each study we assume that no external contract enforce-
ment is possible and that this is common knowledge. This holds true in many trade envi-
ronments and causes serious efficiency issues. And third, on a methodological note, all 
experiments were conducted in a computer laboratory. This facilitated a reliable collection 
of data in a very efficient way that allows for even complex interactions. A detailed expla-
nation of the used methodology and protocols will be part of the respective chapters. 
1.4.1 Research questions and synopses 
This dissertation will consider the following main research questions: 
1. Do long-term relations and voluntary communication provide private-order enforce-
ment and do buyers offer better contract terms to extend the self-enforcing range? 
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2. Do subjects from a developing country have preferences for contract flexibility if they 
trade in very risky environments with asymmetric information? 
3. Do large inequalities in profit from trade reinforce post-contractual opportunism? 
In Chapter 2, which corresponds to the first question above, we examine contract terms 
and performance in a novel contract farming game. The experiment was run in the Göttin-
gen Laboratory of Behavioral Economics (Germany) with student subjects. Previous ex-
perimental studies have analyzed “general” contracts, ignoring peculiarities of the specific 
environment the arrangement is embedded. In this experiment, we consider elements that 
are characteristic for production or resource-providing contracts used in the agricultural 
sector, such as credit provision and an external “spot market” as outside option for the 
farmer player (both hazardous factors for the buyer). In particular, we analyze if and how 
relational contracts and voluntary personal communication can support private enforce-
ment, make relations work efficiently for both parties, and whether buyers offer price pre-
miums to extend the contract’s self-enforcing range—i.e., the range within external cir-
cumstances can change without making breach a profitable strategy. Since both players can 
breach the agreement (as is realistic), each of them is trustor and trustee at the same time. 
From a theoretical perspective (cf. Section 1.1), this chapter is closest to transaction costs 
economics. Although we have symmetric information on the variables and actions within 
the game, we assume a very imperfect institutional environment and thus very high trans-
action costs. A link to the theory of incomplete contracts can be found in the inability of 
third-party institutions, even though the focus on private ordering is clearly in line with the 
transaction costs approach. In a very stylized way, Figure 1.2 depicts the contiguity be-
tween our chapters and the above theoretical streams.  
 




Figure 1.2:  Stylized mapping of theoretical streams and chapters  
Source: Own elaboration based on Brousseau and Glachant (2002) 
Chapter 3 deals with the dilemma of contract flexibility in risky environments. We con-
ducted this artefactual field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) with slum dwellers in 
cooperation with the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics in Nairobi, Kenya. We ex-
amine subjects’ preferences for flexible and rigid agreements, respectively, in a modified 
investment game with hidden knowledge regarding a potential shock. This is a common 
situation in developing countries, causing problems for many trade relations. 
Given the strongly asymmetric information and the problem of moral hazard with hidden 
knowledge, this chapter is mainly concerned with incentive theory, but also bears some 
resemblance to the theory of incomplete contracts, since agreements may be left flexible 
and thus allow for “implicit renegotiation”. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the issues of hidden action and inequity aversion in a developing 
country context. Again, the experiment is carried out with individuals from the Kibera 
slum in Nairobi. In a simple principal–agent game, we investigate if reluctance to trade and 
post-contractual opportunism are reinforced when the agent can observe large (disadvanta-
geous) differences in profit from trade. 
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Similar to the previous chapter, this study is an experimental analysis of incentive theory 
owing to the general existence of hidden action. The chapter’s focus, however, is not on 
the design of an optimal payment scheme—which is exogenously given—but on the occur-
rence of opportunistic behavior contingent on the (agent’s knowledge of) profit inequalities 
between the parties. Thus, theories of fairness and other-regarding preferences are com-
bined with an agency framework. 
1.4.2 Contribution and novelty 
Overall, this dissertation aims at contributing to a better understanding of behavior within 
contractual relationships—in particular, if information asymmetries, incentive issues and a 
lack of formal institutions make exchange more difficult and risky. Opportunistic behavior, 
but also the sheer potential of opportunism, may lead to inefficiencies in value chains and 
severe welfare losses, making this a highly relevant topic. To improve market institutions 
and make value chains more efficient, we need to gain better knowledge of how individu-
als in bilateral trade relations and different contexts actually behave and interact. 
In the upcoming chapters we contribute to both the empirical literature on market institu-
tions in developing countries as introduced in Section 1.2 and the experimental literature 
on behavior in contractual relationships as reviewed in Section 1.3. These experiments 
examine and are guided by contract theory as sketched in Section 1.1.  
Our experiments complement and extend other empirical work on contracts. The research 
in Chapter 2 is original in applying a more complex and holistic setting that uses a specific 
framing and is closer to real-world contract (farming) arrangements than existing experi-
ments: (1) Both players can honor or breach a contract, i.e., both are trustor and trustee at 
the same time, (2) the outside option for sellers depends on conditions in an external “spot 
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market”, (3) the free-form communication is voluntary, and (4) we interact this voluntary 
communication with repeated game/reputation effects. 
The experiments in Chapters 3 and 4 investigate preferences and conduct of individuals 
living in an urban slum and hence go beyond the use of a student “convenience sample”. 
Chapter 3 is novel in examining the direct link between external risk and contract flexibil-
ity. This linkage was presumed before in the empirical literature (Bigsten et al., 2000; Faf-
champs, 2004). To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is the first controlled study of 
this relationship. For this, we introduce a modified investment game with hidden 
knowledge and a choice between two contract designs. Chapter 4 is among very few stud-
ies on other-regarding behavior of individuals living in extreme poverty and applies this to 
a principal–agent setting with moral hazard. Excluding reciprocity as a driving force, it is 
innovative in exploring the link between distributive inequalities and post-contractual op-
portunism in a developing country context. 
The upcoming three chapters will present the experimental studies outlined above. The 
fifth and last chapter summarizes and concludes. In addition, we will suggest implications 
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2. Making it personal: breach and private ordering in a contract farming 
experiment 
Abstract.—Contracts may be subject to strategic default, particularly if public enforce-
ment institutions are weak. In a lab experiment, we study behavior in a contract farming 
game without third-party enforcement but with an external spot market as outside option. 
Two players, farmer and company, may conclude a contract but also breach it by side-
selling or arbitrary payment reductions. We examine if and how relational contracts and 
personal, voluntary communication can support private-order enforcement. Moreover, we 
investigate whether company players offer price premiums to extend the contract’s self-
enforcing range. We find mixed evidence for our private ordering hypothesis. Although 
contract breach can be reduced by relational contracts, direct bargaining communication 
does not additionally improve the outcome. Price premiums are offered if other enforce-
ment mechanisms are absent, but turn out to be only an “allurement”. Most subjects are not 
willing to sacrifice short-term gains in favor of a well-functioning relationship that (as we 
show) would be beneficial for both contract parties in the long run. 
 
Keywords: contract farming, private ordering, enforcement, contract breach, economic experi-
ments, relational contracts, communication, price premiums 
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In the last decades, the use of contracts for governing agricultural supply chains has grown 
increasingly popular in the developing world. Contract farming, defined as agricultural 
production and marketing carried out according to some prior agreement between farmer 
and agribusiness firm (see, e.g., Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Prowse, 2012), can be seen as 
one reaction to the ongoing fundamental changes in global agri-food markets. Trade liber-
alization and agro-industrialization, the proliferation of public and private standards, 
changing consumer preferences and the supermarket boom in many developing countries 
have triggered higher degrees of vertical coordination or even integration (Reardon and 
Barrett, 2000; Reardon et al., 2009). By written or verbal contracts small-scale farmers in 
low-income countries can potentially be linked to modern supply chains and high-value 
export markets. Typically, these farmers suffer from severe imperfections in markets for 
credit, insurance, information, inputs etc. Contract farming arrangements could cushion 
these failures by including credit or input provision by the buyer into the agreement (Key 
and Runsten, 1999). However, there are many open questions and potential hurdles that 
need to be investigated. Numerous studies examine farmers’ preferences or motives to par-
ticipate in contract farming (Masakure and Henson, 2005; Schipmann and Qaim, 2011). 
Others investigate whether contract agriculture increases revenue or welfare (Bolwig, Gib-
bon and Jones, 2009; Bellemare, 2012). 
This chapter is concerned with the problem of strategic contractual default induced by in-
complete agreements or institutional failures. Particularly in developing and transition 
countries, contract farming is subject to poorly functioning legal institutions (Cungu et al., 
2008; FAO, n.d.; World Bank, 2013a; ibid., 2013b). Proper public enforcement lacking, 
“legal centralism” tradition of economics predicts that exchange and investment fail to take 
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place due to the fear of contractual breach and hold-ups. And, as a matter of fact, even if 
courts are not entirely absent, law suits in the wake of breach in contract agriculture are 
rather unlikely since transaction costs are prohibitive (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Minten, 
Randrianarison and Swinnen, 2009). 
One solution to this problem of opportunistic behavior suggested by the theoretical, empir-
ical and historical literature on market institutions is private ordering (Williamson, 1985; 
ibid., 2002). That is, instead of relying on public enforcement and formal punishment 
mechanisms agents attempt to make contracts self-enforcing, use private third parties or 
apply informal mechanisms based on reputation or repeated interaction to enhance mutual 
trust ex ante and support dispute settlement or retaliation ex post (for an overview see 
McMillan and Woodruff, 2000; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2001). Although private-order 
contract enforcement also matters in today’s industrial countries, it is perhaps more promi-
nent in Europe of the late medieval times and the Commercial Revolution (see Greif, 1992 
for a survey) or in developing and transition economies. For instance in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Bigsten et al., 2000; Fafchamps, 2004), Vietnam (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999a; ibid., 
1999b) or Russia (Hay and Shleifer, 1998) economic activities are crucially supported by 
long-term relations, reputation mechanisms and social networks. 
Fafchamps (1996) categorizes the offender’s cost of contract breach in guilt, threat of retal-
iation and coercive action. Considering their origin, we can interpret these costs as support-
ing first-, second- and third-party enforcement, respectively. First-party enforcement im-
plies that private ordering can have its roots in a (potential) cheater’s other-regarding pref-
erences, moral norms or feelings of guilt. Preferences for honesty, general morality or the 
intrinsic value of living up to a promise may well convince agents to stick to an agreement 
(Platteau, 1994). Moreover, the second party (the one cheated on) can threaten with retalia-
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tion—usually in terms of terminating the business relationship and harming the offender’s 
reputation, both potentially resulting in suspension of future trade (see, e.g., Klein, 1996; 
MacLeod, 2007) or social ostracism (e.g., Posner, 1997). Finally, third-party enforcement 
is accomplished through coercive action by other institutions of public or private order. 
Obviously, not all third parties necessarily use coercion, as state institutions and some pri-
vate enforcers outside the law do. Instead, a third party may also provide information or 
coordinate community responses (McMillan and Woodruff, 2000). Whatever mechanism 
or institution is being applied, enforcement of contracts and a trustful relationship is said to 
be achieved when long-term costs of reneging for a party outweigh its short-term benefits. 
A growing body of literature addresses contract farming arrangements empirically. In prac-
tice, contractual default appears to be an issue for both producer and buyer. Guo, Jolly and 
Fischer (2007) and Guo and Jolly (2008) stress that informal enforcement mechanisms are 
central to the Chinese agricultural sector and producers’ contract performance critically 
depends on contract design. Beckmann and Boger (2004) find that even if Polish farmers 
have the opportunity to involve courts, they also consider the indirect costs of doing so. In 
other words, the value of the affected relationship determines whether punishment is used. 
Gow and Swinnen (2001) and Gow, Streeter and Swinnen (2000) present case study evi-
dence for Klein’s (1996) self-enforcing range for transition economies. They show how 
formerly unreliable companies can enhance their trustworthiness through relationship-
specific investments, thus making breach more expensive for themselves. 
The present study uses an experimental approach to investigate subjects’ behavior in a con-
tract farming setting and the effectiveness of private ordering through long-term and per-
sonal relationships. We design a novel experimental game that is akin to real-world con-
tract farming arrangements with an exogenous spot market as outside option. Both players, 
 
2. Making it personal: breach and private ordering in a contract farming experiment 
  
24 
farmer and company, may conclude a contract and breach it by side-selling (farmer) or 
arbitrarily reducing the promised price ex post (company). This way, both players are trus-
tors and trustees at the same time. By using the laboratory, we are able to create a con-
trolled ceteris paribus environment and disentangle the effects of different enforcement 
mechanisms, which is hardly possible with the analysis of survey data (see also Just and 
Wu, 2009). Even though there are some related experiments on contract farming conducted 
in the field (Torero and Viceisza, 2011; Sänger et al., 2013; Sänger, Torero and Qaim, 
2014), most experiments on contractual relationships have been run within lab environ-
ments. They usually assume the form of trust, principal–agent or gift-exchange games. 
Many interesting findings shed light on the existence and role of fairness preferences, reci-
procity and trust in contractual relations (Keser and Willinger, 2000; ibid., 2007; Fehr, 
Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Bohnet, Frey and Huck, 2001; Fehr, Klein and Schmidt, 
2007), but also on the formation of long-term contracts (Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004; Wu 
and Roe, 2007) and the impact of communication (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; 
Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2009). 
We add to this literature by investigating the informal factors influencing contract breach 
in an experimental setting. Unlike others, we do not focus on moral hazard or adverse se-
lection problems (representing special cases of contractual issues) but on the more funda-
mental and often neglected “incentive problems associated with getting parties to honor 
their promises” (Wu, 2014). In particular, we address the following research questions: 
- To what extent do long-term relations provide private-order enforcement and are rela-
tionships improving when agents can personally bargain about contractual terms and 
communicate discontent? 
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- Do company players offer price premiums to increase the self-enforcing range10 of the 
contract in highly uncertain environments?  
- Who benefits from private-order enforcement and does trade in general become more 
efficient? 
- In how far is contract performance associated with subjects’ honesty preferences and 
their general guilt proneness? 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 explains the experi-
mental game and procedures. Section 2.3 derives our behavioral hypotheses. Section 2.4 
presents and discusses the experimental results. The last section concludes. 
2.2 An experimental approach to study behavior in contract farming 
arrangements 
2.2.1 The contract farming game 
Our experimental game comprises two marketing channels and, depending on the channel, 
five potential (decision) stages. These stages are guided by the conceptual framework in 
Barrett et al. (2012) to ensure that the game closely resembles a real contract farming ar-
rangement. In each of the 𝑇 = 15 trading periods, a player in the role of an agri-business 
company (C) purchases units of an agricultural product, and a player in the role of a farmer 
(F) sells her produce. The product is assumed to be of consistent quality. The two players 
may agree on a contract or alternatively use the local spot market for exchange. 
(1) Pre-harvest phase: contract negotiation 
In a first stage, C decides whether to offer F a contract for the purchase of 𝑞ℎ units of F’s 
product. If so, she sets a contract price 𝑝𝑐 > 0 per unit and the game proceeds to the next 
                                                 
10
 That is, the extent to which external circumstances may change without making contract breach beneficial. 
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stage. In the second stage, F decides whether to accept or reject the contract. If F accepts, 
the contract is being concluded. If no offer is made by C in the first stage or if F rejects the 
contract offer in the second stage, both players go directly to the spot market, where they 
buy/sell at an exogenously determined spot market price. 
After the above decisions have been made, in the third stage both players observe the per-
unit spot market price 𝑝𝑠𝑚 determined by a computerized random device. As known to all 
subjects from the beginning, prices can take (integer) values between 1 and 7 (unless oth-
erwise stated all prices are expressed in experimental currency units). As shown in Ta-
ble 2.1, a price of 4 is most likely with a probability of 30 percent. 
Table 2.1:  Spot market prices and their probabilities of occurrence 
 
(2) Post-harvest phase: contract performance 
After observing 𝑝𝑠𝑚, in the fourth stage F decides whether to comply with the agreement 
and deliver to C or to sell to the spot market instead (side-selling). If F delivers, we pro-
ceed to the fifth stage, where C decides if she pays F the agreed-on contract price, 𝑝𝑐, or 
arbitrarily reduces this price by 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡. If in the fourth stage F decides not to deliver, 
both F and C go to the spot market. 
There are some additional features associated with the two marketing channels that influ-
ence the players’ incentives and are crucial elements in real-world contract farming ar-
rangements: 
- Contract. To distinguish our game from other contract experiments, we introduce a spe-
cial form of agreement frequently used in agricultural supply chains, namely a resource-
𝒑𝒔𝒎 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Prob. .05 .1 .2 .3 .2 .1 .05 
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providing contract. Each time a contract is concluded, C bears contracting costs of 𝑠 and 
provides F with a loan 𝑐 that increases her production capacity from 𝑞𝑙 to 𝑞ℎ (with 
𝑞𝑙 < 𝑞ℎ). The existence of this relationship-specific investment in the game is im-
portant, since it provides a strong motivation for F to accept a contract and enhances her 
production (as in many real-world arrangements). At the same time, it increases the risk 
that C has to bear. According to the agreement, 𝑐 has to be paid back at the end of a 
trading period. If F breaches the contract, though, she also refuses to repay 𝑐. 
- Spot market. Each time players use the spot market, they face transaction costs of 𝑘𝐶 
and 𝑘𝐹 (with 𝑘𝐶 , 𝑘𝐹 > 0), respectively. For these costs it is irrelevant if the market is 
used directly or after non-delivery. 
Figure 2.1 summarizes the timeline of events in our contract farming game. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Timeline of events in the contract farming game 
A player’s profit is determined by her revenue minus costs and depends on several factors: 
the quantity sold/bought (smaller for F if no contract is concluded), the price received/paid 
(through the contract or on the spot market), whether the credit is paid back and which 
marketing channel is eventually being used (resulting in the associated transaction or con-
tracting costs). For C, each unit of the purchased produce has a positive value of 𝑣 (e.g., 
the marginal revenue when processing the good). The players’ general (and abstract) profit 
functions are as follows. 
 










In order to play the game in the laboratory, we have to assign parameters to the variables. 
Table 2.2 presents the list of all parameters and a brief explanation for a better overview. 
Table 2.2:  Experimental parameters 
 
Given these parameters, C always buys 𝑞ℎ = 15 units, while F can only supply this quanti-
ty with a contract and accordingly with a credit of 𝑐 = 10. Without contract, F can only 
produce 𝑞𝑙 = 10 units. In case a contract is offered and accepted, C bears the contracting 
Parameter Explanation 
𝑞𝑙 = 10 Produced (low) quantity by F without contract 
𝑞ℎ = 15  Produced (high) quantity by F under contract; demanded quantity by C 
𝑝𝑐 ∈  1,2, … ,7   Price per unit set in the contract 
𝑝𝑠𝑚 ∈  1,2, … ,7  Spot market price per unit, stochastically determined 
𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 ∈  1,2  Arbitrary payment reduction per unit by C after F’s delivery 
𝑘𝐶 = 40  C’s transaction cost for purchasing on spot market 
𝑘𝐹 = 10  F’s transaction cost for selling on spot market 
𝑐 = 10   Credit provided by C to F 
𝑠 = 10   Contracting cost paid by C 
𝑣 = 12  One unit’s value for C (revenue per unit) 
 
𝜋𝐹 = 
𝑞𝑙𝑝𝑠𝑚 − 𝑘𝐹    if no contract 
𝑞ℎ𝑝𝑐 − 𝑐    if both perform 
𝑞ℎ𝑝𝑠𝑚 − 𝑘𝐹   if breach farmer  
𝑞ℎ(𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) − 𝑐  if breach company 
𝑞ℎ𝑣 − 𝑞ℎ𝑝𝑠𝑚 − 𝑘𝐶   if no contract 
𝑞ℎ𝑣 − 𝑞ℎ𝑝𝑐 − 𝑠   if both perform 
𝑞ℎ𝑣 − 𝑞ℎ𝑝𝑠𝑚 − 𝑐 − 𝑠 − 𝑘𝐶   if breach farmer 
𝑞ℎ𝑣 − 𝑞ℎ(𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) − 𝑠  if breach company 
 
𝜋𝐶 = Company player’s profit: 
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cost of 𝑠 = 10. All prices per unit are integers and may range from 1 to 7. C can ex post 
reduce the contract price arbitrarily by 1 or 2 per unit. On the spot market, C faces transac-
tion costs of 𝑘𝐶 = 40, whereas F’s transaction costs equal 𝑘𝐶 = 10. C values each unit of 
the purchased produce with 𝑣 = 12. 
Considering the above parameters, we can simplify the profit functions to make the differ-






We tried to design the stages of our model so as to resemble a real-world contract farming 
arrangement that yet is not too difficult to be played in the lab by non-experts. Unlike in 
many other studies, we deliberately use framing and introduce context to make the diverse 
associations about farmers and agri-business companies part of the experiment. Deploying 
realistic context, compared to the difficult attempt to eliminate it altogether, may boost the 
external validity of experimental findings (Loewenstein, 1999) and, not least, supports the 
subjects’ intuitive understanding of the rather complex payoff functions. However, in the 
instructions and messages displayed on the computer screen we refrain from using strong 
10𝑝𝑠𝑚 − 10  if no contract 
15𝑝𝑐 − 10  if both perform 
15𝑝𝑠𝑚 − 10  if breach farmer 
15(𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) − 10 if breach company 
140 − 15𝑝𝑠𝑚   if no contract 
170 − 15𝑝𝑐  if both perform 
120 − 15𝑝𝑠𝑚  if breach farmer 
170 − 15(𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) if breach company 
𝜋𝐹  = 
𝜋𝐶  = Company player’s profit: 
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normative terms, such as “breach”, “default” or “perform”, and frame decisions and ac-
tions neutrally to avoid demand effects.
11
 
As mentioned earlier, the decisions are broadly guided by the conceptual framework in 
Barrett et al. (2012), but also by other academic and non-academic literature on contract 
farming that inspired and underpins the individual elements of our game. Among others, 
Rehber (2007) states that farmers oftentimes only have the option to accept or reject a con-
tract; they have no say in determining conditions. Glover (1984), Key and Runsten (1999) 
and Masakure and Henson (2005) mention that credit provision, also in-kind, for investing 
in the farm and enhancing productivity is common and one major motivation for small-
holders to participate in contract schemes. This is partly due to the high transaction costs 
that characterize input and output markets in many developing countries. If agents did not 
face such high transaction costs (as is the case for more standardized agricultural commod-
ities), contracts would become redundant (Minot, 2007). Although the spot market prices 
and their probabilities are somewhat arbitrary in our experimental game, producers and 
processors do experience strong fluctuations also in real-world settings, exposing small-
holders and agri-business firms to considerable price risk (MacDonald et al., 2004). Most 
importantly for the relevance of our experiment, previous empirical work has found strate-
gic contract default from either party to be a frequent problem in contract farming ar-
rangements (Glover, 1984; Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen, 2009; Swinnen and 
Vandeplas, 2010). 
                                                 
11
 More specifically, we avoided their German equivalents and other terminology that comes with strong 
negative or positive associations. See Appendix 2A for the experimental instructions. 
 




Our experiment consists of three conditions that differ with respect to their nature of com-
pany–farmer relationships and potential private-order enforcement. First, with the short-
term or classical contract (CC) we define a baseline as reference point for comparison 
with the private-order enforcement conditions. Farmer and company players are matched 
randomly in each period. The counterpart’s identity is unknown and there is no possibility 
to observe past behavior. A subject may interact with the same partner again, but no one 
knows if and when this will happen. After each repetition (except for the last), a message 
on the computer screen reminds participants of the following random assignment. With 
this stranger matching protocol, reputational and relational effects are very unlikely and 
thus private enforcement mechanisms are largely absent.
12
 
Second, we introduce a relational contract (RC). In this condition company–farmer pairs 
remain steady over the 𝑇 = 15 trading periods, i.e., the game is played as a (finitely) re-
peated game and every player can observe the other’s behavior in this ongoing relation-
ship.
13
 Unlike in Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) and Wu and Roe (2007), relationships in our 
experiment are exogenous and players cannot change partners. The spot market represents 
an outside option, though, if they do not wish to interact with their particular counterpart. 
                                                 
12
 Some informal enforcement mechanisms may work nonetheless. It is still possible for C to offer attractive 
contract conditions (we will return to this in Section 2.4.2). If subjects in the CC condition comply in cases 
where contract breach would be beneficial for them, this may be due to, e.g., guilt aversion or cognitive con-
straints (see also Section 2.3.2). We will address guilt feelings and honesty in Section 2.4.4. 
13
 Relational contracts are typically modelled as a repeated game with infinite horizon. In the lab, we would 
thus need to implement an unknown or probabilistic rather than a known deterministic termination rule. 
However, we believe that we would considerably lose control when playing the game with unknown or ran-
dom termination. Subjects might have very different expectations about when the game will end. Normann 
and Wallace (2012) show that the termination rule does not significantly affect average cooperation. To con-
trol for endgame effects (Selten and Stoecker, 1986), we shall provide, where appropriate in the data analysis, 
additional analysis excluding the final period. 
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Our third condition is a direct bargaining (DB) treatment. In terms of matching protocol, 
the DB equals the RC. However, we introduce the opportunity for a more personal rela-
tionship and dispute resolution. While rarely mentioned in the theoretical literature, the 
important role of direct bargaining and personal visits for contract enforcement is exten-
sively discussed in the empirical literature (e.g., Fafchamps, 2004)—either as an ex ante 
mechanism of inspection and information gathering or an ex post method of conflict reso-
lution. In our game, before a new period begins, C can opt for a “farm visit”, which implies 
that C and F can communicate for 120 seconds in an electronic chat room. Framing this 
action neutrally as a “visit” comes with the advantage that subjects are free in what they 
communicate about and we largely avoid demand effects. C decides if and when this free-
form communication takes place, however it is restricted to one during the entire 15-
periods game. 
While a comparison between the CC and RC enables us to isolate the impact of relational 
contracting on contract formation, performance and profits, a comparison between the RC 
and the DB outcomes helps to understand the additional effect of communication on the 
self-enforcement of contracts. An analysis of the behavior within the DB condition can 
reveal if this personal communication device can contribute to strengthening relationships 
and enforcing promises. 
2.2.3 Experimental procedures and implementation 
The experiment was carried out in the Göttingen Laboratory of Behavioral Economics in 
Germany between May and August 2013 and was computerized with the software package 
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). For the recruitment of participants we used a university subject 
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pool and the ORSEE system (Greiner, 2004). Consequently, the vast majority of partici-
pants are students. 
Upon arrival, participants received the experiment’s written instructions and they were 
read aloud to them. Subsequently, everyone went to a computer booth and individually 
answered questions to prove full comprehension of the different decisions and their conse-
quences. Facilitators were on hand to assist with individual queries. Since the number of 
parameters is large and the payoff functions are rather complex, participants were required 
to perform several test calculations. Only after everyone had successfully completed the 
questionnaire, the actual experiment started.
14
 The game was played for 𝑇 = 15 trading 
periods either in the CC, RC or DB condition (between-subject comparison). Afterwards, a 
post-experimental questionnaire was administered, followed by the participants’ individual 
cash payment. Company players earned EUR 0.01 for each currency unit they earned in the 
game, farmer players earned EUR 0.02 per currency unit.
15
 Both additionally received a 
show-up fee of EUR 3. On average, a participant in the role of a company made EUR 16 in 
a session, a farmer player almost EUR 18 (the mean of EUR 17 equals about USD 23 at 
the time of implementation). A typical session lasted approximately 1.5 hours. 
We implemented a total of eleven experimental sessions—five for the CC, three for the RC 
and three for the DB condition. In each CC session we had 20 participants, while each RC 
and DB session was attended by 24 subjects. Hence, we have a total of 244 participants 
with nobody attending more than one session. Each subject is randomly assigned the role 
                                                 
14
 We have good reason to believe that the level of understanding the game among participants was suffi-
ciently high. In our post-experimental questionnaire, subjects were asked to rate the comprehension of in-
structions from 0 (very incomprehensible) to 10 (very comprehensible). The mean value in our experiment is 
8.14. 
15 
We did not want participants to leave the lab with large income differentials contingent on their role. 
Therefore, the different exchange rates are necessary when we intend to maintain the profit differences in the 
game. This, however, does not change the players’ incentives. 
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of a company or a farmer player at the beginning of the experiment. There is the same 
number of company and farmer players in a session. With 72 subjects in the RC and DB, 
respectively, we obtain 36 steady pairs due to a partner matching protocol and thus 36 in-
dependent observations per condition. In the CC, however, we use a stranger matching 
protocol. Unbeknownst to the subjects, we divide a session into two matching groups, con-
taining five company and five farmer players. Matching is only done within a matching 
group and there is no interaction between groups. By this means, we obtain ten independ-
ent observations for the CC. 
2.3 Theoretical predictions and hypotheses 
2.3.1  Subgame perfect equilibrium 
To derive our first hypothesis, we determine the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) for 
risk-neutral, rational and selfish agents by backward induction. As participants know that 
this game has a finite horizon, we can apply the following predictions to every single repe-
tition. 
In the final stage, C chooses  
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑞ℎ𝑣 − 𝑞ℎ𝑝𝑐 − 𝑠, 𝑞ℎ𝑣 − 𝑞ℎ(𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) − 𝑠}. 
Given that 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 > 0, C will always opt for breach and reduce the contract price by the 
maximum 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡. 
Anticipating this, in the fourth stage, F only delivers if her profit from delivery and the 
following breach by C is at least equal to the profit from side-selling. That is, 
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Hence, delivery is guaranteed if the price difference satisfies  
𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑠𝑚 ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡) +
𝑐−𝑘𝐹
𝑞ℎ
 .  
For our specific parameters, F’s delivery constraint is thus 
𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑠𝑚 ≥ 2, 
which implies that F will comply with the agreement if and only if the contract price is at 
least 2 above the observed spot market price. Otherwise, she will sell to the spot market 
instead. Note, F’s transaction costs in case of side-selling and the credit non-repayment 
cancel each other out in this calculation. 
In the second stage, F always accepts a contract since 
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑞ℎ𝑝𝑠𝑚 − 𝑘𝐹 , 𝑞ℎ(𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡)} > 𝑞𝑙𝑝𝑠𝑚 − 𝑘𝐹 
with 𝑞ℎ > 𝑞𝑙. That is, F is always better off receiving the credit, increasing her production 
capacity from 𝑞𝑙 to 𝑞ℎ and then reverting to the spot market (if more beneficial), than di-
rectly selling 𝑞𝑙 = 10 in the spot market. 
Considering all of the above, in the first stage, C chooses the maximum between her ex-
pected payoff without offering a contract (𝑞ℎ𝑣 − 𝑞ℎ𝑝𝑠𝑚 − 𝑘𝐶) and her expected payoff 
with contract (taking F’s responses into account). Solving this maximization problem for 
the optimal decision and the optimal choice of 𝑝𝐶 is far from being trivial. This is why we 
provide a numerical solution for our specific parameters in Table 2.3. Accordingly, C max-
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Table 2.3:  C’s expected profits depending on contract price, spot market price and F’s predicted 
behavior 
 
Standard economics hypothesis:  
(i) Side-selling occurs if the farmer player’s delivery constraint (𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑠𝑚 ≥ 2) is not 
satisfied. The company player, however, will always breach the contract reducing the 
paid price by the maximum 𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 2 when the farmer player delivers. 
(ii) Anticipating this, the company player offers the highest contract price of 𝑝𝐶 = 7 at 
the beginning of the game. 
2.3.2  Alternative behavioral predictions  
The predicted SPE of our stage game theoretically holds true for all repetitions and condi-
tions. Economic theory also starts from the premise that personal communication is merely 
“cheap talk” and does not change the equilibrium, as promises are not enforceable and both 
players know that. This, however, does not mean that we in fact expect real subjects to 
behave that way if selfishness and complete rationality are not common knowledge and if 
we allow for relational and reputational effects. It remains an empirical question, how 
         𝒑𝒔𝒎 
















1 105 90 75 60 45 30 15 60 
2 105 90 75 60 45 30 15 60 
3 155 90 75 60 45 30 15 62.5 
4 140 140 75 60 45 30 15 66.75 
5 125 125 125 60 45 30 15 74.5 
6 110 110 110 110 45 30 15 84.25 
7 95 95 95 95 95 30 15 84.5
*
 
No offer 125 110 95 80 65 50 35 80 
* highest expected profit for C 
Notes: For the grey-shaded contract price–spot market price combinations, 
F’s delivery constraint is not satisfied, which indicates that she breaches the 
contract. Thus, C’s profit is contingent on the spot market price. In the non-
shaded areas (excluding “No offer”), F is predicted to comply with the con-
tract, and C’s profit thus depends on the contract price. 
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long-term relations and personal communication for direct bargaining and coordination 
influence contract performance, prices and (as a consequence) players’ profits. 
That is, while our first hypothesis predicts a player’s utility to solely depend on her imme-
diate pecuniary payoff, we now consider additional indirect costs of breach and a more 
complex utility function based on the conceptual framework and notation by Fafchamps 
(1996; 2004): 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖 − 𝐺𝑖(𝜏𝑖, ) − 𝑃𝑖(𝜏𝑖, , 𝜃) − 𝐸𝑉𝑖(𝜏𝑖, ) − 𝐸𝑊𝑖(𝜏𝑖, ) 
where 𝑖 ∈  𝐶, 𝐹 , 𝜋𝑖 is the player’s immediate monetary payoff, 𝐺𝑖 the cost of feeling 
guilty, 𝑃𝑖 coercive action, e.g., by state institutions, 𝐸𝑉𝑖 denotes the suspension of future 
trade with this trading partner, and 𝐸𝑊𝑖 the damage to the offender’s multilateral reputa-
tion. These indirect costs depend on the player’s type 𝜏𝑖 and the state of nature . Coercive 
action by the state is additionally contingent on the form of contract 𝜃. This general formu-
la, holding for virtually all contractual relationships, can be simplified for our experimental 
conditions. While third-party coercion 𝑃𝑖 is considered impossible (and thus zero), we can 
also ignore 𝐸𝑊𝑖 as former behavior is not observable to players other than the one trading 
with. In the CC, even 𝐸𝑉𝑖 becomes zero. As  can be considered constant
16
, a player 𝑖 in 
our contract farming game will maximize her expected utility with respect to 𝜋𝑖, 𝐺𝑖(𝜏𝑖) as 
well as—in the RC and DB condition—𝐸𝑉𝑖(𝜏𝑖), contingent on her type 𝜏𝑖 (unscrupu-
lous/honest). 
Thus, departing from the standard theoretic predictions, we believe that private enforce-
ment through relational contracts generally works here by influencing the subjects’ utility 
                                                 
16
 We interpret  here as a measure of, e.g., the occurrence of a negative production shock. However,  does 
not refer to the stochastic spot market price. While also being an element of the trade environment, spot mar-
ket prices can be understood as opportunity cost of an agreement and do not influence the ability to comply 
with the contract terms (only, perhaps, the willingness). 
(2.10) 
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from trade. Previous studies have found that subjects consider the “shadow of the future” 
and care about their bilateral reputation in contractual relations (e.g., Gächter and Falk, 
2002). We build on this literature, investigating whether repetition is a sufficient condition 
for relationships to work well and analyzing the magnitude of such effects in our contract 
farming experiment. We expect the direct bargaining communication—by personalizing 
exchange and facilitating coordination—to further strengthen relationships (e.g., Ben-Ner 
and Putterman, 2009). If a company player can credibly show that she will pay the offered 
price, the rate of side-selling could be lowered and both players may move to a more coop-
erative equilibrium. Hence, we expect to observe fewer dysfunctional relationships and 
less contract breach in the DB condition. 
Furthermore, some of the literature emphasizes that contract parties can use price premi-
ums to make agreements self-enforcing if other mechanisms are absent (e.g., Swinnen and 
Vandeplas, 2011). We hypothesize that this endogenous enforcement device will be used 
by company players, in particular in the absence of other private-order enforcement mech-
anisms. 
Private ordering hypothesis: 
(i) In the RC and DB condition contract breach from either party can be significantly 
reduced relative to the CC. Moreover, the DB outperforms the RC as it provides ad-
ditional opportunities for private-order enforcement. 
(ii) The offered contract price in the CC is higher than in the other conditions, as in the 
absence of other private-order enforcement mechanisms company players offer price 
premiums to extend the contract’s self-enforcing range. 
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2.4 Experimental results 
2.4.1 Contract breach and the effectiveness of private ordering 
Opportunistic contract breach by farmer players (side-selling) is expected to depend on the 
contract price–spot market price difference (henceforth CSMD). According to our standard 
economics hypothesis farmer players breach if the CSMD is smaller than 2. Contract de-
fault by the company, in turn, does not depend on other factors and reducing the price by 
the maximum (𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 = 2) is a dominant strategy.  
Side-selling. On average, side-selling occurs in 44.6 percent of concluded contracts
17
 in the 
CC, in 27.6 percent in the RC and 26.3 percent in the DB. Also Figure 2.2, panel (a) sug-
gests that side-selling is significantly more frequent in the CC compared to the RC 
(p = 0.0739) and the DB (p = 0.0427).
18
 That is, long-term relationships seem to mitigate 
contract default from farmers’ side in our experiment. However, the possibility for direct 
bargaining has no additional effect (RC–DB difference: p = 0.8611). This does not change 
if we exclude the final period from the analysis. 
Over the 15 periods, there is no clear trend of increasing or decreasing levels of side-
selling. Rather, we observe many ups and downs, which are associated with the volatile 
spot market price and the resulting changes in the CSMD. In the RC and DB condition, 
side-selling increases towards the end of the game when the relationship becomes less val-
uable given the weaker “shadow of the future”. 
                                                 
17
 A contract was offered on average in 82.5 percent (CC), 83.9 percent (RC) and 81.9 percent (DB) of all 
trades. These differences are not significant using non-parametric Mann–Whitney U tests. Contract ac-
ceptance rates are 94.2 percent (CC), 91.2 percent (RC) and 97.1 percent (DB). Differences between DB and 
the other conditions are significant on the 5-percent level. The CC–RC difference is not significant. 
18
 Unless otherwise stated, significance levels refer to two-sided, non-parametric Mann–Whitney U tests 
based on the session means of all independent observations (i.e., steady pairs or matching groups). 
 




Figure 2.2:  (a) Side-selling (as share of all contracts) by farmer players, (b) payment reduction        
(as share of all payments) by company players, and (c) mean contract prices offered  
However, the positive effect of the long-term relationship on side-selling is likely to be 
underestimated here. As we will discuss in the next section, the offered mean contract price 
in the CC is significantly higher than in the RC and DB and side-selling is indeed strongly 
contingent on the CSMD. This price difference is on average 1.23 in the CC and only 0.18 
in the RC (p < 0.0001) and 0.48 in the DB (p = 0.0004). Consequently, we need to apply 
regression analysis to control for price differences and obtain the real treatment effects. 
The first part of Table 2.4 summarizes the results of different probit regression models 
with Side-selling as the dependent variable, which takes the value of 1 if the farmer player 
breaches the contract and 0 otherwise. The results show that side-selling is significantly 
more likely in the CC relative to the other conditions. There is no additional treatment ef-
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fect of the DB, though, suggesting that the long-term relationship is the mechanism at work 
here. The coefficient of Period is positive and significant in all estimated models (except 
for the first), indicating that farmer players become less reluctant to breach over time. 
Model (1) reveals that a farmer player is much more likely to breach if she suffered from 
breach by the company player in the previous round (Lagged breach experienced). The 
impact of the difference between contract and spot market price (CSMD) is negative and 
highly significant, as expected. This negative relationship is particularly strong in the CC 
compared to the other conditions, as contract breach here does not depend on relational and 
reputational factors, but rather on a pure profit calculus. The results in model (3) do not 
change considerably if we exclude the final period. 
As hypothesized in Section 2.3.1, rational and selfish farmer players, expecting the compa-
ny player to reduce the price by the maximum, will sell to the spot market when the CSMD 
is below 2. To assess whether farmer players in the experiment consider their delivery con-
straint, Figure 2.3 displays side-selling as the share of all concluded contracts subject to a 
certain price difference. Results show that only 55 percent of the farmer players in the CC 
breach the contract when the CSMD is positive and below 2; in the RC and DB this share 
is even lower at 17 and 15 percent, respectively. The design of our experiment does not 
allow to disentangle whether this is due to the farmer players’ own dislike of breach, repu-
tation concerns or expectation of how the company will behave in the final stage. But 
based on our data we can conclude that even in the CC, side-selling is not as frequent as 
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Figure 2.3:  Side-selling (as share of all concluded contracts) conditional on the contract price–
spot market price difference (CSMD) 
Payment reductions. In the CC, company players are somewhat reluctant to breach during 
early periods, but almost always reduce the paid price in the second half of the experiment 
(Figure 2.2, panel (b)). On the average, they pay 1.65 currency units less than promised. In 
the RC and DB, subjects behave much more in favor of the relationship, although default 
still occurs—particularly in the end, when the value of the relationship tends to fall. Com-
pany players reduce the price, on average, by 0.46 in the RC and by 0.53 in the DB in the 
case of delivery. 
As for side-selling, the CC–RC (p = 0.0033) and CC–DB differences (p = 0.0047) are sig-
nificant, but no additional effect from the direct bargaining communication can be found 
(RC–DB difference: p = 0.8375). The same picture holds if we exclude the final period 
from the analysis. Accordingly, company players’ breach can also be significantly reduced 
in long-term relationships. 
Probit regression analyses with payment reductions as the binary dependent variable shed 
more light on what determines the company players’ behavior. The second part of Ta-
ble 2.4 reveals that in all estimated models the occurrence of payment reductions can be 
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ment effect of the DB. Moreover, company players’ breach slightly increases over time. As 
for farmer players, a bad experience in the previous period increases the probability of own 
contract breach significantly (even though the farmer player delivered in the current peri-
od). Interestingly, the coefficient of CSMD is always positive and significant, indicating 
that company players are more likely to breach with an increasing difference between con-
tract and spot market price—even though theoretically the CSMD should not influence 
their decision. Apparently, we do not only observe strategic default, but also what we in-
terpret as “emotional contract breach”: In case of a large positive price difference, compa-
ny players realize that they could have earned more without an agreement and that the 
farmer is the main beneficiary of the contract arrangement. As a consequence, they can 
justify reducing the price arbitrarily (presumably feeling less guilty). 
 
Figure 2.4:  Occurrence of different payment reductions (as share of all payments) 
The aggregated results in Figure 2.2, panel (b) as well as the probit estimations in Ta-
ble 2.4 treat payment reductions as a binary variable, taking the value of 1 if the company 
player reduces the paid price (regardless of by how much) and 0 otherwise. According to 
the subgame perfect equilibrium, the company player will always reduce the payment by 
the maximum amount of 2, and if a company player considers reputational effects or feels 
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across all conditions only a small share of payments is reduced by 1 currency unit, whereas 
in most of the cases either a zero or a maximum reduction is chosen. 
Direct bargaining and conflict resolution. Before we turn to the analysis of contract terms, 
we address the question of why the direct bargaining communication did not additionally 
improve contract compliance at the aggregate level as expected by our private ordering 
hypothesis. In the empirical literature, direct bargaining and personal visits are considered 
one method for contract enforcement, preventing and resolving contractual disputes when 
public enforcement institutions are weak as is often the case in developing countries 
(McMillan and Woodruff, 1999a; Bigsten et al., 2000; Fafchamps, 2004).  
 
Figure 2.5:  Occurrence and timing of direct bargaining communication in the DB condition 
One potential answer to this question can be found in Figure 2.5, which not only depicts 
the timing of communication, but also the number of company players who did not contact 
their counterpart at all. We can see that most chats take place within the first periods of the 
experiment and the number declines in later rounds. This choice indeed makes sense when 
company players hope to positively influence as many upcoming game periods as possible. 
Surprisingly, in one-third of the DB relationships no communication took place at all. This 
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Apparently, some company players did not regard one-time communication as a promising 
means for consolidating the relationship and coordinating exchange. 
In fact, a closer look at those relationships in which a personal contact was established 
shows that the effectiveness of communication for reducing contract breach is limited. 
Comparing the level of contract breach before and after the chat reveals that no significant 
decrease of side-selling could be achieved (p = 0.2059, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). For 
company players, default even increases after the communication due to the endgame ef-
fect in the DB (p = 0.0606, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The latter finding vanishes when 
we exclude the final period, but a significant impact in the expected direction is not ob-
servable for either type of player. However, when we distinguish well-functioning and ra-
ther dysfunctional relationships (see Section 2.4.3 and Table 2.6), it is striking that in all 
well-functioning relations in the DB the company player opted for a chat at a certain point 
throughout the experiment. We thus can reject the conjecture that individuals refrained 
from communicating because their trading relationship was already functioning well. 
Result 1: In the CC condition, side-selling is not as frequent as predicted by our standard econom-
ics hypothesis. In contrast, payment reductions tend to occur in almost every transaction. 
Result 2: Contract breach from either side can be significantly reduced by relational contracts, 
reflecting a repeated game effect. Surprising is, however, that the additional direct bargaining 
communication does not improve contract compliance. In addition, for one-third of the company 
players communication did not represent an attractive option. 
Result 3: We find evidence that company players’ default is not only strategic, but also “emotion-
al”, i.e., the probability of an opportunistic payment reduction increases with a larger difference 
between contract price and spot market price. 
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2.4.2 Price premiums as enforcement mechanism  
In all three conditions, average contract prices offered by company players are well below 
the price of 7 suggested by the subgame perfect equilibrium (Figure 2.2, panel (c)). In the 
CC, company players offer 5.15 on the average, which is significantly higher than the con-
tract prices of 4.30 offered in the RC (p = 0.0001) and 4.57 offered in the DB condition 
(p = 0.0016). Furthermore, the RC–DB difference is also significant at p = 0.0153.  
One potential explanation for the higher contract prices offered in the CC is that company 
players know they can “allure” farmer players with an attractive contract price (i.e., an ef-
ficiency premium) and thereby increase the probability of delivery. This is in line with the 
literature on price premiums in agricultural value chains, arguing that “[m]aking the con-
tract self-enforcing by paying [or offering] an efficiency premium is a rational strategy for 
the buyer, as it can earn him a better payoff than her outcome when being held up, or upon 
contract breakdown” (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 2011). As we have shown in the previous 
section, company players in the CC are also more likely to reduce the price in the end. In 
the RC and DB condition, in contrast, subjects rather try to stick to what they promise—
and thus promise less—in order not to sour the relationship. In fact, once we compare the 
actual contract prices paid at the end of the period (after potential payment reduction by the 
company player), we do not find a significant difference between the average price paid in 
the CC (3.87) and those paid in the RC (4.03) and DB (4.13).
19
 Only the RC–DB differ-
ence is significant at p = 0.0903. This supports the interpretation that high-price offers in 
the CC are used as an “allurement tactic” to increase the probability of delivery, given that 
company players can later breach the contract without fearing consequences. 
                                                 
19
 This only takes into account those trades in which a contract was formed and the farmer delivered to the 
company player. 
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While all average contract prices are substantially below the maximum, we do find that in 
the CC and RC prices are rising over time, indicating that company players tend to learn 
that it is rational to offer higher prices. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing mean prices 
in periods 1–7 with mean prices in periods 8–15 reveal significant price increases in the 
case of the CC and RC conditions (CC: p = 0.0069; RC: p = 0.0056; DB: p = 0.9037).  
In the DB somewhat different dynamics are at work and the average contract prices offered 
do not display a similar increase over time. We believe that this—as well as the higher 
average contract price offered in the DB relative to the RC—can be ascribed to the direct 
bargaining communication. As discussed above, most chats were conducted in an early 
period of a session, providing the opportunity for early coordination and bargaining. Dur-
ing these chats, subjects often tried to negotiate a certain contract price and promised to 
mutually comply.
20
 As a result, the offered prices are already relatively high in the begin-
ning, but do not grow over the course of the game. 
Result 4: In a highly uncertain environment where no relational and reputational capital can be 
accumulated, company players offer price premiums to increase the contract’s self-enforcing 
range. However, this is only an “allurement tactic” as they do not pay the premium in the end. 
2.4.3 Who (potentially) benefits from private-order enforcement? 
On the average, the profit per period earned by company players amounts to 𝜋𝐶 = 82.95 in 
the CC, 𝜋𝐶 = 89.26 in the RC, and 𝜋𝐶 = 88.40 in the DB condition. These differences 
are, however, not statistically significant according to non-parametric tests. This result 
does not change when we exclude the final period from the analysis. 
                                                 
20
 An overview of all chat messages will be provided upon request. 
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Table 2.5, column (1) presents results from a regression analysis taking into account all 
possible trades. The results reveal that company players generally earn more in a contrac-
tual relationship and when long-term relations are possible. Moreover, profits slightly de-
crease over time. Taking only those trades into account in which contracts were concluded 
(column (2)), we see that company players’ profits are by far lower in the CC, as side-
selling occurs significantly more often under this condition than in long-term contractual 
relations. There is no additional treatment effect associated with the DB. Companies’ prof-
its increase with a rising CSMD (again because of the self-enforcing effect). This influence 
is smaller in the RC and DB, albeit still positive, since here also other mechanisms besides 
short-term price incentives apply. 
Table 2.5:  Determinants of profit (in one period) 
 
 

































































































































































N 1830 1425  1830 1425  1830 1425 
R² .028 .281  .283 .083  .319 .318 
Notes: Table shows results for OLS regressions; RC is the omitted condition; robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) are adjusted for clustering at the independent observation level; 
*** 
indicates significance at 1%,   
** 
significance at 5%, and 
* 
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For farmer players, relational contracts seem to have no general positive effect. On the 
average, they earn 𝜋𝐹 = 48.61 per period in the CC, 𝜋𝐹 = 48.51 in the RC and only 
slightly more in the DB condition (𝜋𝐹 = 50.69). As for company players, these differences 
are not significant using non-parametric tests. This may seem surprising as contract breach 
by the company player can be significantly reduced in long-term relationships. However, 
as shown above, prices actually paid to the farmer players in the end do not significantly 
differ between the CC and the other conditions. Yet, farmer players in the RC and DB are 
more reluctant to breach and go to the spot market, in cases where this would be more 
profitable. 
The regression results in Table 2.5 confirm our non-parametric test results. We find no 
statistically significant differences between conditions considering all trades (column (3)). 
The coefficient of the Contract-dummy is large and significant as farmer players (by de-
sign) earn much more when a contract is formed. Looking only at the trades in which a 
contract was concluded (column (4)), we even find that farmers earn slightly more in the 
CC compared to the long-term contracts. Profit is marginally rising over time, and a higher 
CSMD is associated with lower farmer profits, although the latter finding is only signifi-
cant at the 10-percent level. 
Regarding joint profits, we find that efficiency slightly increases with the opportunity for 
more private ordering. While both players together earn 𝜋𝐶 + 𝜋𝐹 = 131.56 per period in 
the CC, they obtain 𝜋𝐶 + 𝜋𝐹 = 137.77 in the RC and 𝜋𝐶 + 𝜋𝐹 = 139.08 in the DB, on the 
average. These differences are not statistically significant and only the CC–DB difference 
becomes significant (p = 0.0984) when we exclude the last period from the analysis to con-
trol for endgame effects. 
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The regression results in Table 2.5 (column (5) and (6)) depict that long-term relationships 
do lead to significantly higher efficiency—unlike non-parametric tests suggest—once we 
control for other factors. This holds true for all trades, and even more so when only consid-
ering trades in which a contract is concluded. Again, we cannot identify an additional 
treatment effect for the DB. In general, contracts are associated with higher efficiency in 
our experiment, which is mostly due to the experiment’s design (column (5)). Over time, 
joint profits slightly decrease (as contract breach increases). Also, CSMD is positively cor-
related with joint profits, as a higher price difference reduces side-selling and joint profits 
are largely determined by company players’ payoffs. Analogous to company players’ prof-
its, the positive influence of CSMD is greater in the CC (column (6)). 
Concluding this section on profits and efficiency, Table 2.6 offers a comparison of well-
functioning and dysfunctional relationships in our partner matching conditions. The cate-
gorization of relationships is based on the definitions stated in Table 2.6. We find that both 
players, company and farmer, in well-functioning relations earn significantly more than 
their peers in rather dysfunctional ones, although there is no significant difference in the 
offered contract prices between well- and less functioning partnerships (RC: p = 0.8732; 
DB: p = 0.3792). We further see that not even one-third of the relationships in each condi-
tion can be considered well-functioning and, in particular, the DB did not substantially 
increase this share. It is somewhat unexpected that the opportunity for more coordination 
and more personal relationships, the direct bargaining communication, was not useful (or 
was not used) to build better functioning relations. 
The large number of dysfunctional relations may also be due to the quasi-locked-in situa-
tion. Unsatisfied subjects cannot switch to other contract partners since our game does not 
provide a competitive market for contracts with different potential buyers or sellers as, for 
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instance, in Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004). In the real world, companies have a larger pool 
of farmers with whom to contract and thus may replace reneging producers in the long run 
for more reliable suppliers. 
Table 2.6:  Well- and less functioning relationships in the RC and DB condition 
 
Result 5: Both players earn more within a contractual relationship (which is also due to the exper-
imental design). In our setting, where both players may breach a contract, the company player 
alone can skim off the benefits from private-order enforcement. 
Result 6: Both players benefit from well-functioning relationships that are characterized by high 
contract formation and compliance rates, compared to dysfunctional or short-term relations. How-
ever, most subjects do not sacrifice short-term profits on behalf of long-term benefits, challenging 
the theory of self-enforcing contracts. 
2.4.4 Compliance, guilt proneness and preferences for honesty 
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, besides (the fear of) retaliation and the use of 
third-party contract enforcement, honest behavior and order can also originate in the moral 
 
 well-functioning less functioning p value 
Definition 
Contract formation ≥ 80 %  
Side-selling ≤ 20 %  
Default company ≤ 20 %  
Contract formation < 80 % 
Side-selling > 20 % 
Default company > 20 % 
 
RC 
Number of relationships 10 26  
Mean profit company 100.67 84.87 0.0005 
Mean profit farmer 55.07 45.99 0.0225 
Mean joint profit 155.73 130.86 < 0.0001 
DB 
Number of relationships 11 25  
Mean profit company 97.64 84.33 0.0020 
Mean profit farmer 57.18 47.83 0.0046 
Mean joint profit 154.82 132.16 < 0.0001 
Notes: Mean values of profits are expressed in experimental currency units; p values refer to non-parametric 
Mann–Whitney U tests 
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norms within a society and the offender’s “cost” of feeling guilty (i.e., first-party enforce-
ment). Platteau (1994) argues that a generalized morality may reduce enforcement costs, 
and moral norms largely determine the conditions under which honesty is likely to be es-
tablished and sustained. Hence, besides the potential mechanisms for private ordering in-
corporated in the different conditions in our experiment, moral norms internalized by the 
subjects (and learned outside the lab) may explain part of the compliance rate. According 
to Platteau, there are five such conditions that positively correlate with honesty: 
(1) If many individuals generally prefer honesty. 
(2) If they trust in others to prefer honesty as well. 
(3) If this preference is not readily weakened by bad but strengthened by good experiences. 
(4) If offenders are prone to guilt feelings. 
(5) If honest individuals sanction offenders, even if they are not directly affected. 
In the following, we empirically investigate Platteau’s proposition and assess whether hon-
esty in our experiment (i.e., compliance with a contract) is directly correlated with the con-
ditions (1) to (5).
21
 While the dependent variable is based on our experimental data, infor-
mation on the explanatory conditions is collected through a questionnaire. The question-
naire was administered to all subjects directly after the actual experiment and, among oth-
ers, contained questions related to honesty preferences and guilt feelings. To increase the 
reliability of the answers, subjects were again reminded that the evaluation of the data 
would be completely anonymous. In addition, at the end of the questionnaire they were 
asked to indicate how honest and complete they would rate their answers. It was conferred 
                                                 
21
 Unlike Platteau’s argumentation, our investigation is based on the individual level. That is, we are not 
looking at breach or compliance rates within a session but at the behavior of a subject in a contractual situa-
tion, which deviates from Platteau’s focus on “society” and breaks his conditions down to the micro level. 
Therefore, although the five conditions guide our investigation, it is not an evaluation of Platteau’s theory in 
a strict sense. 
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Table 2.7 displays the results of probit regressions for company and farmer players, respec-
tively. In all regression models we control for cluster-correlated standard errors at the indi-
vidual subject level. In addition to treatment dummies and other factors from the experi-
ment that may influence contract breach or compliance (cf. Section 2.4.1), we now include 
questionnaire responses linked to Platteau’s five conditions. We can see that the signs and 
significance levels of the explanatory variables generated in the experiment remain robust 
(cf. Table 2.4). Here, we thus focus on the discussion of the seven variables related to hon-
esty and guilt. 
The first variable, Wallet, refers to Platteau’s condition (1), the individual preference for 
honesty. We asked subjects to imagine they find a wallet with money and an ID with the 
owners address in the streets and no one is around; what is the probability (0–100 percent) 
that they return the wallet including all money. For both types of players, coefficients are 
small and insignificant. 
The second variable, Contract breach, refers to trust in the honesty of others. We asked 
participants whether they believe that the other participants breached a contract in the 
game whenever it was beneficial to them and they did not have to fear any consequences. 
The variable equals 1 if the answer is yes and 0 if it is no. For both players, we find a nega-
tive effect on contract compliance, as predicted by theory, but only for farmer players the 
coefficient is significant at the 10-percent level. 
 
                                                 
22
 Subjects were asked to rate the honesty and completeness of their own answers from 0 (very dishon-
est/incomplete) to 7 (very honest/complete). From our analysis we excluded every subject with a score below 
6, that is 13 subjects in total. 
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Table 2.7:  Probability of contract compliance including data on honesty and guilt feelings 
 
The variables Negative influence and Positive influence refer to condition (3). We asked 
subjects if they would break a rule more often (less often) if others in their environment 
would do the same. Again, both variables are dummies and take a value of 1 if the answer 
is yes and 0 if it is no. Interestingly, those who consider themselves to be vulnerable to 
negative influence were less likely to breach a contract in the game, which seems contra-
dictory to theory. We do not find a significant effect of the variable Positive influence for 
either type of player. 
 























































































N 886 1366 
Pseudo R² .415 .314 
Notes: Table shows results for probit regressions; RC is the omitted condition; robust 
standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering at the individual subject 
level; 13 subjects are excluded here as they indicated a low level of honest and 
complete answers; 
*** 
indicates significance at 1%, 
** 
significance at 5%, and 
* 
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Furthermore, we asked subjects to rate their level of guilt feelings in six fictitious but spe-
cific situations from 1 (not guilty at all) to 7 (very guilty). These situations range from can-
celing a meeting with friends using a false excuse to the theft of money. The variable Guilt 
score is simply the aggregate of these six ratings, without weighting the different situa-
tions. Our results do not show a significant relation between a subject’s general susceptibil-
ity to guilt feelings and contract compliance in the experiment. 
Finally, the variables Sanctioning and Receive sanctioning relate to condition (5). The first 
is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the subject was willing to anonymously and appropri-
ately punish someone who finds the above-mentioned wallet and does not return the mon-
ey, and 0 if she would refrain from sanctioning. The latter variable is the subject’s expecta-
tion of receiving anonymous and appropriate punishment by others if being observed not 
returning the wallet (probability 0–100 percent). We find that farmer players who claim 
that they would punish dishonest individuals are more likely to comply with a contract in 
the game, which is significant at the 10-percent level. The regression does not show a sig-
nificant relation between the breaching behavior in the experiment and the stated expecta-
tion of punishment by others. 
Result 7: There is only limited evidence that individuals’ honesty preferences correlate with their 
contract performance in the experiment. We find no impact of the stated guilt proneness on con-
tract compliance. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have shown how real subjects behave in a contract farming experi-
ment—in which a player is both trustor and trustee—and how behavior changes with the 
introduction of potential private-order enforcement via relational contracts and the oppor-
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tunity for direct bargaining communication. Additionally, we investigate if buyers offer 
price premiums when lacking other formal and informal enforcement mechanisms, and 
whether contract compliance correlates with subjects’ honesty preferences and their gen-
eral guilt proneness. 
We find only mixed evidence for our private ordering hypothesis. Not all of the above re-
sults ought to be repeated here, yet three findings are particularly remarkable from our 
point of view. First, long-term relations do indeed help to mitigate contract breach, but 
one-time communication or “visits” do not suffice to make them more personal and further 
improve cooperation. Hence, in respect of contractual self-enforcement, at least this kind 
of communication appears to be mere “cheap talk” and some subjects seem to anticipate 
that. Second, contract terms offered to farmer players are more favorable in an environ-
ment without reputational effects, but these premiums are not paid in the end. Third, the 
fact that well-functioning relations pay in the long run but were formed relatively rarely in 
our experiment does not support the proposition that an agreement readily becomes self-
enforcing when short-term profits from reneging are smaller than the loss of future gains. 
Therefore, these contractual relations would be likely to benefit by some coordination from 
outside, leading to mutual gains. If a judicial system is not entirely absent, small-claims 
courts can be useful to credibly threat offenders with legal consequences. Additionally, 
producer organizations may function as intermediaries between buyer and farmer (Minot, 
2007). The possibility for neutral, third-party quality checks (Sänger, Torero and Qaim, 
2014) could in practice reduce the probability of arbitrary payment reductions and thus 
side-selling. 
There is certainly much scope for future research to design new mechanisms and institu-
tions for private (or public) ordering and test their effect on contract enforcement experi-
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mentally. In this context, the existence of producer organizations, intermediaries or differ-
ent contract designs may represent interesting treatments. One variation of our study could 
be running sessions excluding the final stage (i.e., without possible breach by the company 
player). If the number of dysfunctional relationships is significantly diminished, compared 
to what we observe, a possible conclusion would aim at buyers’ influential role in deter-
mining the outcome of contract farming arrangements and the necessity to police the pay-
ment process. 
One issue with most laboratory experiments is their use of student subjects mainly from 
Western, educated, industrial, rich, and democratic backgrounds (usually referred to as the 
“WEIRD” problem). Future research may also take similar experimental designs to the 
field and run them in a developing country context with actual farmers. This should then 
allow deriving more applied policy recommendations to improve contract farming ar-
rangements and the operation of agricultural value chains in practice. 
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We will play a game in which you make decisions and earn real money. How much you earn de-
pends both on your own decisions and the decision of other players. Please do not talk to other 
participants until the experiment is finished. 
In this game you are randomly assigned the role of a farmer or a food company that purchases 
agricultural products for processing. Each participant remains in his or her role until the end of the 
game. In each round, you will be randomly paired with one participant of the opposite role. Conse-
quently, you do not interact with the same player in every round. All participants remain anony-
mous at all times.  
The game consists of 15 repetitions (periods). 
Each period, the farmer produces a certain quantity of a good. The company purchases a certain 
quantity of the same good. Both have the opportunity to conclude a contract on production and 
trade, in which the company sets a contract price. If a contract is concluded, the company provides 
an interest-free loan to the farmer, which is invested and increases the farmer’s production capaci-
ty. Alternatively, the farmer can sell on the local market and the company can purchase on this 
market. In that case, both depend on the stochastically determined market price and both pay so-
called transaction costs for using the market. 
The Decisions 
In each period, the following decisions are made: 
1. The company decides whether or not to offer the farmer a contract. If so, she sets a con-
tract price she is willing to pay the farmer per unit. If no offer is made, both players di-
rectly go to the local market. 
2. The farmer observes whether or not a contract was offered and, if so, the offered contract 
price. If an offer was made, the farmer decides about accepting the contract. In that case, 
the contract is concluded and the farmer increases her production capacity from 10 to 15 
units. If she rejects, both go to the local market. There, the farmer sells 10 units, the com-
pany purchases 15 units. 
3. The local market price per unit is determined stochastically. It can take a value between 1 





                                                 
*
 This document is an English translation of the experiment’s German instructions used when running ses-
sions of the CC condition. The original version and the instructions of other treatments will be provided upon 
request. 
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A price of 1 ECU occurs with a probability of 5 %.  
A price of 2 ECU occurs with a probability of 10 %.  
A price of 3 ECU occurs with a probability of 20 %.  
A price of 4 ECU occurs with a probability of 30 %.  
A price of 5 ECU occurs with a probability of 20 %.  
A price of 6 ECU occurs with a probability of 10 %.  
A price of 7 ECU occurs with a probability of 5 %. 
  
4. Both players observe the determined market price. If a contract was concluded, the farmer 
now decides whether she delivers the quantity promised in the contract and repays the 
loan. Alternatively, she can sell everything (15 units) on the local market for the current 
market price. In that case, the company’s loan is not being repaid.  
5. If the farmer delivered the promised quantity, the company now decides whether she pays 
the contract price as agreed upon. Alternatively, she can reduce this price by 1 or 2 ECU. 
 
For the company, each unit of the purchased good has a value of 12 ECU (for processing).  
Is a contract concluded, the company bears the contracting cost (10 ECU) and grants the farmer a 
loan (10 ECU). The loan’s repayment upon delivery is stipulated in the contract. 
Does the company use the local market, she pays transaction costs of 40 ECU. Does the farmer 
use the local market, she pays transaction costs of 10 ECU. Here, it does not matter when a player 
uses the market. 
The Payoffs 
The farmer’s payoff in one period consists of the following: 
- For units she delivers to the company in accordance with the contract, she receives the con-
tract price, possibly less the company’s payment reduction. 
- For units sold on the market, she receives the local market price reduced by the transaction 
cost (10 ECU). 
- If she delivers in accordance with the contract, she repays the loan (10 ECU). 
The company’s payoff in one period consists of the following: 
- She receives the value of 12 ECU for each unit she purchases (no matter where). Thus, in 
total she receives 180 ECU. 
- For units delivered by the farmer in accordance with the contract, she pays the contract 
price, possibly less the payment reduction. 
- For units purchased on the market, she pays the local market price and her transaction cost 
(40 ECU). 
- If a contract is concluded, she bears the contracting cost (10 ECU) and grants an interest-
free loan (10 ECU) to the farmer that is repaid if the farmer delivers. 
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After each period, farmer and company players are informed about their individual payoffs of the 
period just completed. Afterwards, a new period with a randomly assigned trading partner begins. 
On the computer screen, you will obtain an overview of the decisions made in previous rounds. 
The game ends after 15 periods and you will get paid. Your total payment results from the ECUs 
earned in the game (exchange ratio: 1 ECU = 0.02 € for farmer players and 1 ECU = 0.01 € for 
company players) plus your show-up fee. 
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3. Risky environments, hidden knowledge, and preferences for contract 
flexibility: An artefactual field experiment 
Abstract.—Contract flexibility can be expedient for economic exchange in environments 
with high ambiguity and risk, but may also encourage opportunistic behavior. We run a 
modified investment game, including the choice between two different contract designs 
and asymmetric information about the realized surplus (i.e., hidden knowledge). We exam-
ine if Nairobi slum dwellers choose flexible over rigid contracts when interacting in risky 
environments and whether preferences for contract flexibility are sensitive to the exoge-
nous probability of experiencing a negative shock. We find that most interaction is realized 
through flexible agreements. Principals offer a higher level of flexibility if the likelihood of 
a shock is high, relative to the low-risk environment. Agents are somewhat more reluctant 
to sign rigid agreements when facing the threat of a bad state. While agents and the overall 
efficiency benefit from higher flexibility, principals always do better by opting for a rigid 
contract. 
 
Keywords: contract flexibility, risk sharing, hidden knowledge, artefactual field experiment, 
investment game, Nairobi slums, Kenya 
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Renegotiations and contract flexibility do not always have a good record in contract theo-
ry— for at least two reasons. First, when contracts are incomplete or public enforcement is 
inefficient, the possibility for renegotiating contract terms may lead to commitment prob-
lems, to hold-ups and underinvestment (see, e.g., Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Wil-
liamson, 1985; Hart and Holmström, 1987; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Hart, 1995). Simi-
larly, if the agreement leaves space for discretion and unilateral changes due to information 
asymmetries, strong incentives for strategic behavior and false statements arise. 
A second argument against contract flexibility is offered by a more recent strand of litera-
ture, suggesting that contracts serve as reference points (Hart and Moore, 2008). Involved 
parties feel entitled to the best outcome an ex ante agreement allows for, even if they know 
that the eventual outcome may be less favorable. Accordingly, flexibility and renegotia-
tions might result in aggrieved agents, conflicts and even welfare losses. 
In spite of all these arguments, the empirical literature on market institutions in developing 
countries has a different view on renegotiations and stresses that without ex post flexibility 
exchange in highly uncertain environments could often not occur at all. The reason is that 
after signing an agreement some agents may find it hard or even impossible to comply with 
rigid contract terms—albeit willing to do so—due to external shocks and they fear harsh 
retaliation. Moreover, a first-moving principal is usually better off receiving part of the 
promised surplus or a reimbursement of her investment than receiving nothing at all upon 
contract breakdown. 
The prominent problem is one of asymmetric information and post-contractual opportun-
ism. Regularly, a principal cannot observe if breach of contract is due to an external shock 
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or strategic behavior by the agent. It is therefore impossible to make sanctioning (say, ter-
minating the relationship or harming the offender’s reputation) contingent on the reason of 
breach.
23
 Hence, principals are faced with a trade-off: Harsh sanctioning can help to daunt 
fraudulent agents and opportunistic behavior, but may also prevent bona fide trade from 
taking place as agents are generally assumed to be risk-averse. No sanctioning, in turn, can 
support exchange, but also opportunistic behavior and adverse selection. 
Contract flexibility may help in situations of uncertainty and induces an implicit sharing of 
risk between the contracting parties. Some literature suggests that it is regularly used in 
business relations in Kenya (Fafchamps et al., 1994), Ghana (Fafchamps, 1996), Zimba-
bwe (Fafchamps, 1997), and other economies in sub-Saharan Africa (Bigsten et al., 2000; 
Fafchamps, 2004). Vietnamese firms appear to be reluctant to retaliate against breaching 
trading partners, because it is not possible to perfectly distinguish between strategic default 
and “acts of nature” that are beyond an individual’s or firm’s control (McMillan and 
Woodruff, 1999b). 
Bigsten et al. (2000: 5) understand contract flexibility as a voluntary adjustment to particu-
lar environments or circumstances: 
“Flexibility arises when contractual performance is made explicitly or implicitly contingent 
upon external events affecting one of the parties. The idea is that a supplier who cannot de-
liver or client who cannot pay is allowed to renegotiate the contract and default from his or 
her original obligations. Flexibility is thus a form of insurance, of risk sharing.” 
To the best of our knowledge, there is so far no experimental research with subjects from 
low-income countries that investigates preferences for contract flexibility in a controlled 
                                                 
23
 Here we assume that courts cannot be used for various reasons, yet the problem is also likely to occur with 
the existence of a functioning legal system as many circumstances are unobservable to a third party. 
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environment, and additionally examines if the risk of a (production) shock directly and 
positively correlates with the use of flexible agreements. Identification issues, critical dif-
ferences in political and market institutions or the impossibility to objectively evaluate risk 
make the use of observational data for studying contractual relations highly problematic 
(see, e.g., Just and Wu, 2009). Experimentation, by contrast, enables us to exogenously 
alter the trade environment while holding other influencing factors constant. 
With this chapter we contribute to both the experimental literature on behavior in contrac-
tual (principal–agent) relationships and the empirical literature on informal market institu-
tions in the developing world. We address the question of whether poor individuals from 
sub-Saharan Africa, who are regularly affected by and vulnerable to external shocks, 
choose flexible over rigid contracts when trading in environments of high risk and asym-
metric information. Moreover, we raise the question if flexible contracts are more often 
accepted relative to rigid ones and if agents exploit this discretion and act increasingly op-
portunistically. Finally, we explore whether both parties benefit from contract flexibility, 
especially in high-risk environments. 
Following the taxonomy by Harrison and List (2004), we run an “artefactual field experi-
ment”
24
 with urban slum dwellers from Nairobi, Kenya. All subjects live in Kibera, the 
city’s largest informal settlement and a playground for vivid informal economic activity. 
Residents’ regular exposure to shocks and the many economic and social interactions be-
yond the reach of formal institutions make them a very relevant population for our study. 
Using a modified investment game (based on Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995), we in-
tend to create a very simplistic and easily understandable setting of sequential exchange. 
                                                 
24
 The distinction between artefactual and framed field experiment is somewhat blurred. We believe that our 
study rather belongs to the former category as the use of field context and framing is still limited (see Harri-
son and List, 2004). 
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Unlike the standard game, our version involves agreements and asymmetric information on 
the state of nature and, thus, realized surplus. We are only aware of very few other papers 
studying investment games with information asymmetries of this or similar kind (Coricelli, 
Morales and Mahlstedt, 2006; Castillo and Leo, 2010; Clots-Figueras, Hernán Gonazáles 
and Kujal, 2012), which are very different from our contribution in terms of design, re-
search question and study population, however. Technically speaking, we examine a prob-
lem of moral hazard with hidden knowledge or “post-contractual adverse selection” (Ras-
musen, 2007: ch. 10). Arrow (1985) understands hidden knowledge—in distinction from 
hidden action problems—as the agent’s private information on a state (e.g., productivity). 
Others emphasize the timing of a particular information asymmetry and define hidden 
knowledge as one that occurs after a contract is signed (Holmström and Milgrom, 1987; 
Tirole, 1999). As argued above, this information and incentive issue is undisputedly com-
mon in many principal–agent relations in risky environments, but rather neglected in the 
behavioral and experimental economics literature.
25
 We aim to fill this gap by applying the 
problem to a developing country context and investigate whether contractual flexibility 
provides a solution. 
In our game, a first-moving principal can decide to transfer points to a second-moving 
agent, using a flexible or a rigid contract. With a certain probability the transferred amount 
is productive or subject to an external production shock. Yet this state is private infor-
mation of the agent who can then return points to the principal. In case a rigid contract is 
used, repayment is considered a fixed amount, and if the agent cannot—or is not willing 
to—transfer the agreed points, she returns zero and the principal can harshly retaliate. If a 
                                                 
25
 One reason for this is perhaps the experimental literature’s emphasis on problems of hidden action, where 
the state of nature (e.g., the quality outcome) is a random variable with a distribution contingent on the 
agent’s action choice. Another might be the oftentimes missing distinction against problems of adverse selec-
tion that appear before the contract is concluded. The situation examined in this chapter is indeed similar, but 
not identical. 
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flexible contract is used, the agent is free to also return any different amount, contingent on 
the observed state (which is unknown to the principal). This design enables us to compare 
preferences for contract flexibility and their allocative consequences in environments with 
different degrees of risk.
26
 
We find that the majority of observed interaction is realized through flexible agreements. 
In high-risk environments the probability of a flexible contract offer is significantly higher 
relative to the low-risk environment. Agents accept more flexible than rigid agreements 
when facing the threat of a negative shock. The high degree of flexibility is particularly 
surprising given that principals do not benefit from it and are in general better off when 
opting for rigid agreements. At the same time, rigid contracts lead to considerable welfare 
losses owing to extensive retaliation and the higher rejection rate in the conditions that 
exhibit risk. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we explain the experimental 
game, procedures and protocols. Section 3.3 reveals our theoretical predictions and hy-
potheses. Section 3.4 summarizes our main results. The last section concludes. 
3.2 Experimental design 
3.2.1 A modified investment game with contracts and hidden knowledge 
In our sequential game, a principal and an agent player can conclude a contract on the 
transfer and repayment of points. The game is played for a finite number of 𝑇 = 8 repeti-
                                                 
26
 It is, however, not suitable to investigate the aforementioned reference-points hypothesis (for experimental 
evidence see Fehr, Zehnder and Hart, 2009; Erlei and Reinhold, 2010; Fehr, Hart and Zehnder, 2011a; ibid., 
2011b; Bartling and Schmidt, 2015). This is because in our design no response to outcomes of flexible 
agreements is possible and, moreover, the incomplete contracts literature throughout assumes symmetric 
information on the state of the world. Yet, the assumption that this state is public information is not realistic 
for many economic interactions. This is why we consider the distinction between an incomplete contract and 
a contract under asymmetric information as essential (as argued in Hart and Moore, 1988). 
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tions, following two practice periods in which no points can be earned. To largely avoid 
reputation effects, we use a stranger matching protocol and a principal player is not 
matched with the same agent in each period.
27
 We conduct three different conditions with 
varying probabilities of an external shock in order to study subjects’ behavior contingent 
on the degree of risk in the environment of trade. Both players receive the same initial en-
dowment of 𝑀 = 10 (points) at the beginning of a period. 
Our modified investment game consists of the following five stages: 
Stage 1 (Contract offer and choice)—The principal decides whether to offer the agent an 
agreement that can be flexible or rigid in nature, 𝑐 ∈  0, 𝑓, 𝑟 . As the terms “flexible” and 
“rigid” might be loaded and rather complicated, subjects chose between a blue (mkataba 
wa bluu) and a yellow agreement (mkataba wa njano). An agreement 𝑐 ≠ 0 states that the 
principal transfers her entire endowment 𝑀 = 10 to the agent who returns 𝑅 eventually. If 
𝑐 = 0, both players keep their initial endowments 𝑀. Note that unlike in the standard in-
vestment game the principal can only send all points or none (for a summary of the differ-
ent contract terms see Table 3.1). 
Stage 2 (Contract acceptance)—The agent observes the potential contract offer and type. 
If 𝑐 ≠ 0, she decides whether to sign this contract and thereby accept its terms, 𝑠 ∈  0,1 . 
If 𝑠 = 0, both keep their initial endowments; if 𝑠 = 1 the principal’s points are sent and we 
proceed to the next stage. 
                                                 
27
 In sessions with 16 or more subjects we used a perfect stranger matching protocol. Yet, this was not possi-
ble in smaller sessions since not enough matching partners for eight periods were available (owed to no-
shows). We believe, however, that subjects were practically unable to assess if there is a sufficient number of 
matching partners in the room and they are matched with one or two participants twice. We are thus optimis-
tic that there is no systematic difference between smaller and larger sessions and the one-shot nature of the 
experiment is retained. When running regressions, we control for small sessions by including a dummy vari-
able. 
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Stage 3 (State of nature)—The agent (and only the agent) observes the state of nature  
which may be good (hali nzuri) or bad (hali mbaya), ∈  𝑔, 𝑏  with 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏( = 𝑏) = 𝑝 and 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏( = 𝑔) = 1 − 𝑝. If = 𝑔, the amount sent by the principal will be tripled (𝑘 = 3) 
and the agent now owns 40. If = 𝑏, the transferred points remain unchanged (𝑘 = 1) and 
the agent now owns 20. The outcome of  is and remains the agent’s private information. 
Stage 4 (Contract performance)—The agent decides on the amount 𝑅 she returns to the 
principal. If the agreement is flexible, then 𝑅 ∈  0,1, … ,10 + 10𝑘 . That is, the agent can 
send back any amount between zero and the maximum she owns (with 𝑘 depending on ). 
If a rigid agreement was chosen, then 𝑅 ∈  0,20  and repayment can thus only be the 
amount of 20 fixed in the contract or nothing, respectively. That means, a rigid agreement 
stipulates an even division of surplus in case the state turns out to be good. In a bad state 
(where no surplus is produced), compliance would still be possible but leaves the agent 
with zero and therefore the loss of her endowment. The principal will not observe if a re-
payment of less than 20 points is due to an unfortunate situation beyond the agent’s control 
or to opportunistic behavior (that, in reality, could be masked as an external shock). 
Stage 5 (Retaliation)—If a rigid agreement was chosen and 𝑅 = 0, the principal can retal-
iate with reducing the agent’s profit by 𝛿 ∈  0,15  (𝛿 can be interpreted, e.g., as damage to 
the agent’s reputation). However, there is no contract enforcement possible. That is, 𝛿 does 
not influence the principal’s payoff (π), only reduces the agent’s (𝑢) by 15 points. Ta-
ble 3.1 summarizes the contract terms. 
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Table 3.1:  Rigid and flexible contract terms 
 
If no contract is offered or signed, both players keep their initial 10 points. If they interact, 
the principal will earn whatever the agent returns. The agent’s payoff consists of her own 
endowment and the principal’s points sent (either tripled or unchanged), reduced by the 
amount she returns and the potential sanction in case of breaching a rigid agreement. 





We first implement a so-called “LOW” condition, in which a bad state occurs with a prob-
ability of 𝑝 = 0.1. Second, in the “HIGH” condition, probability of a bad state is 𝑝 = 0.5. 
To have a comparison of how individuals behave without the general possibility of a 
shock, we run a few sessions of a third “NO SHOCK” condition (𝑝 = 0) in which a prin-
cipal player, like in the standard investment game, has complete information on the real-
ized surplus. 
10     if 𝑐 = 0 or 𝑠 = 0 
𝑅     if 𝑐 ≠ 0 and 𝑠 = 1 
10     if 𝑐 = 0 or 𝑠 = 0 
10 + 10𝑘 − 𝑅 − 𝛿   if 𝑐 ≠ 0 and 𝑠 = 1 
Payoff principal: π = 






(𝑐 =  𝑟) 
Flexible contract 
















“quid” Principal’s endowment 𝑀 Principal’s endowment 𝑀 
“quo” Fixed amount of 2𝑀 
Also more or less than 2𝑀 contingent 
on  (unobservable to the principal) 
 
Consequences of 
𝑹 < 𝟐𝑴 
Agent returns 0, principal    
can retaliate by 𝛿 
Agent returns “what she can”,             
no retaliation possible 
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3.2.2 Discussion of design features 
Before we turn to the experimental procedures and protocols, we discuss some of the 
choices we made with regard to our game. Note that in all conditions we use an extreme 
form of flexibility and mere “implicit” renegotiation, where the agent has full discretion on 
the repayment. This extreme form as well as the fact that an agent is aware of her discre-
tion before accepting an agreement may seem little realistic. Similarly, one might argue 
that in reality a later (ex post) relaxation of rigid contract terms and an actual renegotiation 
are likely if the agent can credibly communicate the occurrence of a shock. With our de-
sign, however, we follow previous experimental studies examining flexible and rigid con-
tracts, e.g., Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (2011a) and Brandts, Charness and Ellman (2012), and 
introduce a clear distinction between the two contract designs. The exclusion of “hybrid 
forms” allows us to make the difference between the two contract designs more salient and 
thus better capture individuals’ preferences for flexibility or rigidity in exchange. 
Moreover, one may claim that the rigid agreement differs from the flexible with respect to 
two elements: The reduced action space (agent has fewer return options) and the potential 
retaliation. However, we reckon that fixed repayment and punishment directly belong to-
gether and characterize a rigid contract design (“Either you send me what we agreed on, or 
I will retaliate”). With a flexible agreement the same reference value for repayment 
(20 points) is given by the contract. As a deviation from this reference value is allowed to 
facilitate risk sharing, though, no sanctioning can be possible by definition. 
Further note that the potential retaliation amount of 15 points lies between 𝑀 and 2𝑀. It is 
thus more than the unproductive transfer received by the agent in a bad state, but less than 
the “compliance amount” fixed in the rigid contract. As we do not intend to measure nega-
tive reciprocity (or the extent of altruistic punishment) and only the general threat of sanc-
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tioning is important to our design, we try to avoid overload and confusion by omitting pun-
ishment costs for the principal (as, e.g., de Quervain et al., 2004 do in one treatment). 
In addition, one needs to bear in mind that in the LOW and HIGH condition the principal 
faces two different kinds of risk: the shock risk and what can be labeled the “strategic risk” 
of opportunistic behavior by the agent. Our design does not allow disentangling these dif-
ferent sources of risk. Even so, as subjects are randomly assigned to a condition we can 
assume that “strategic risk” and the perception thereof is distributed equally between con-
ditions—and all differences in behavior and preferences trace back to a variation in shock 
risk. 
Finally, we should briefly discuss why we decided against a compulsory contract offer by 
the principal (and a mere choice of contract type). We intend to examine a situation of vol-
untary contracting, in which both principal and agent have the chance to also refuse inter-
action. This is not only more realistic and generates more information; we additionally 
believe that a “forced” contract offer would be likely to influence the principal’s decision 
on the contract type, which, in turn, results in a biased statement of preferences.
28
 
3.2.3 Subject pool, lab environment, and procedures 
We ran our experiment with subjects from the Kibera slum in Nairobi, Kenya, the city’s 
largest informal settlement with an estimated 170,000–270,000 residents.
29
 A closer look at 
the life in the slum reveals that, in particular, two instances make Kibera residents a very 
relevant population for our study. 
                                                 
28
 For example, a player who is reluctant to send her points in our game might be biased towards a rigid con-
tract design if forced to offer an agreement. As a consequence, the flexible–rigid contract ratio would alter 
compared to a situation with voluntary exchange. 
29
 For long time, Kibera was considered the biggest African slum with an estimated population of up to 1.5 
million. An official census in 2009 and investigations by the Map Kibera Project drastically refuted and 
scaled down these figures, however (see, e.g., Karanja, 2010). 
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First, there is a widespread engagement in economic activity outside the reach of formal 
institutions and regulations (for a portrayal of the slum’s business practices see The Econ-
omist, 2012). In Kenya, about 11.2 million people (more than 80 percent of workforce) are 
estimated to have a job in the informal sector, and the rate is increasing (KNBS, 2014). 
According to the country’s statistical service, “[t]he informal sector is characterized by 
small scale-activities that are semi-organized [and] unregulated […]. The sector plays a 
vital role in the economic development by increasing competition, fostering innovation, 
besides generating employment” (ibid.: 78). Compared to the country’s average, the scope 
of informal economic activity is likely to be even higher in Kibera, a place without any 
formal legal basis (Amis, 1984). In fact, legal institutions are hardly ever used for settling 
conflicts about property rights or contractual issues. Instead, besides bilateral negotiations, 
enforcement in Kibera relies on ethnic gangs or community based NGOs (Joireman and 
Vanderpoel, 2010). Both lack proper legal status and come with considerable social cost 
(gangs) or are only semi-effective (NGOs).  
Second, interviews with business owners during field trips suggest that dwellers are regu-
larly affected by unpredictable events and shocks (health, production, weather, etc.). Usu-
ally, informal insurance mechanisms, such as borrowing from friends and neighbors, are 
used to cope with these risks. 
All of the above indicates a need for private ordering and flexibility when engaging in ex-
change with others. At the same time, potential preferences for flexibility are unlikely to be 
overestimated, since trust levels in the slum have been reported to be particularly low. 
While Kenya in general is regarded as a country with abundant corruption and a very low 
level of mutual trust among people (Camerer, 2003: ch. 2.7), Kibera gained reputation as 
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“a place considered among those in the world where cooperation and trust/trustworthiness 
are scarcest” (Becchetti, Conzo and Romeo, 2014: 284). 
Our experimental sessions were run between July and August 2014 in the Busara Center 
for Behavioral Economics close to the slum. The Busara Center is affiliated to the NGO 
Innovations for Poverty Action Kenya (IPA-K) and offers a state-of-the-art infrastructure 
for behavioral research, including a laboratory with twenty touchscreen computers (for 
details see Haushofer et al., 2014). 
Participants were randomly invited from the Busara subject pool of roughly 2,500 Kibera 
residents via SMS. As a sufficient understanding of probabilities is crucial to our study, 
subjects were required to have a minimum level of education, namely completed primary 
school. Upon arrival, facilitators confirmed participants’ identity via fingerprint and ran-
domly assigned them to a computer booth. After signing a consent form, everyone com-
pleted a short test to prove sufficient ability to handle the touchscreen. Experimental in-
structions were read aloud and explained in Swahili while subjects received an English 
handout with figures and important concepts of the game, such as an overview of the dif-
ferent agreements, the decisions and the probabilities.
30
 After individual queries were an-
swered, participants went through a number of comprehension questions. Like all on-
screen elements, these questions were programmed by the software package z-Tree (Fisch-
bacher, 2007) and did not allow subjects to merely guess answers in a trial-and-error man-
ner. If a participant got an answer wrong, a facilitator was required to “unlock” the screen 
and explain the respective part of the experiment again. Only after everyone successfully 
completed all questions, the game started with two practice rounds and proceeded with 
                                                 
30
 See Appendix 3A for an English version of the instructions, handout and comprehension questions. 
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eight “real” periods, in which points could be earned.
31
 Following this game, another short 
experimental test was conducted (part of Chapter 4 in this dissertation) and subjects filled a 
post-experimental survey. 
At the end of a session, participants were informed about their earnings from the game they 
will obtain in addition to a show-up fee of KES 200.
32
 While they received this show-up 
fee in cash (for transport), additional earnings were transferred to the participants’ MPesa 
accounts (again, see Haushofer et al., 2014 for details). One point earned in the game was 
exchanged to KES 2 resulting in an average payment of KES 420 (in total; excluding earn-
ings from the second experiment). A typical session lasted approximately two hours. 
We ran a total of 15 sessions; six of the LOW, six of the HIGH, and three of the NO 
SHOCK condition. A session was attended by at least 12 and at the most 20 subjects, 
which yields a total number of 240 participants. The differences in turnout between the 
sessions are owed to no-shows. 
3.3 Behavioral predictions and hypotheses 
Under the assumption of full rationality and exclusively selfish preferences, the theoretical 
solution of the standard investment game also holds here. Anticipating that the agent will 
not return anything, the principal decides not to send her points and both leave the game 
with their initial endowments. As our game explicitly contains two different types of con-
tract and the chance for a negative shock, we still need to determine the agent’s best re-
sponse if an agreement is being offered. It is straightforward to see that there is no reason 
                                                 
31
 In the post-experimental survey, subjects assessed their own understanding of the game with 4.08 on a 
scale reaching from 1 (“very poorly”) to 5 (“very well”). We thus believe that the general comprehension 
level was sufficiently high. 
32
 At the time of the study USD 1 was worth about KES 88. Earnings were well above participants’ average 
opportunity costs of time. Average monthly income in our sample is KES 4.800 as stated by the participants. 
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not to sign a flexible agreement, as the agent (like in the standard investment game) can 
freely decide how much she returns and sanctioning is ruled out. With a rigid contract, 
though, a rational response is not so obvious. If a bad state occurs and the agent returns the 
fixed amount of 20, she is left with 0. If she returns 0 and is being punished, she earns 5 
which, again, is lower than her payoff without interaction. In general, the agent accepts a 
rigid contract if 
     𝐸[𝑢(𝑐 = 𝑟)] ≥ 𝑀,           (3.3) 
that is, her expected payoff from interaction is at least as high as her reservation payoff. 
Analogous to (3.2), the agent’s expected payoff in case of a rigid contract is 
   𝐸[𝑢(𝑐 = 𝑟)] = 10 + 10𝑝 + 30(1 − 𝑝) − 𝑅 − 𝛿         (3.4) 
with 0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1, 𝑅 ∈  0,20  and 𝛿 ∈  0,15 . 
As a return of 𝑅 = 20 is higher than the potential sanction 𝛿 = 15, we can assume that the 
agent knows she will always breach the contract. Hence, her expected payoff becomes  
    𝐸[𝑢(𝑐 = 𝑟)] = 40 − 20𝑝 − 𝛿.          (3.5) 
Thus, even if the agent conservatively expects the principal to always retaliate, (3.3) is 
satisfied with a shock probability of 𝑝 ≤
3
4
. Consequently, a risk-neutral agent accepts eve-
ry contract, even in the HIGH condition. 
Contrary to the backward induction solution, the experimental literature on investment 
games suggests that there is a non-negligible number of individuals who do trust and recip-
rocate (for a meta-analysis see Johnson and Mislin, 2011; for a developing country survey 
see Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). Some papers even report investment/trust game results 
from the Nairobi slums in particular (Greig and Bohnet, 2008; Becchetti, Conzo and Ro-
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meo, 2014). Following these studies, we expect a proportion of subjects to show willing-
ness to interact and examine the following four hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the risk of a bad state in the environment of exchange, the more 
likely principals are to offer a flexible contract. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that subjects have preferences for flexibility and risk sharing in envi-
ronments with high risk, based on their experience with informal money lending or insur-
ances and their own business activities. As argued above, one reason is that agents are ex-
pected to dislike rigidity when risk is high and shocks are private knowledge (cf. hypothe-
sis 2); thus principals may choose flexible contracts to increase the likelihood that their 
offer will be accepted. Second, in a bad state the principal might expect the agent to recip-
rocate and to return at least the investment 𝑀, which is possible under flexibility. 
Hypothesis 2: Agents are more likely to sign flexible than rigid contracts. They are partic-
ularly reluctant to sign rigid contracts in the high-risk environment. 
Hypothesis 2 is closely related to hypothesis 1, but considers the agent’s perspective. 
Agents fear retaliation if they experience a bad state and do not return the agreed amount 
(they are left with zero if they do). Hence, they always prefer flexible agreements—and 
more so if the probability of experiencing a shock is high. 
While our focus is on the preferences for different contract designs and thus on hypothe-
ses 1 and 2, we also formulate expectations about the agent’s ex post behavior and both 
players’ benefits under the different contractual arrangements. 
Hypothesis 3: With flexible agreements agents more often fail to return 20 points and 
show more opportunistic behavior relative to rigid contracts. 
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There are two reasons why we expect this. First, a flexible contract allows agents to adapt 
to bad states without having to return nothing at all to the principal. This is the potential 
advantage and risk-sharing function flexibility provides. Second, even in a good state 
agents do not fear consequences when returning less than 20. This is what can be interpret-
ed as opportunistic behavior. 
Hypothesis 4: In the high-risk condition, both players benefit from using flexible agree-
ments. Yet, this does not hold in the other conditions. 
This hypothesis is based on the premise that ex post flexibility can potentially lead to better 
outcomes than rigidity in environments where external shocks are likely (Fafchamps, 2004; 
Bigsten et al., 2000). Therefore, even if agents in general return fewer points with flexible 
agreements as posed by hypothesis 3, these contracts still lead to more interaction and 
higher returns in the HIGH condition where zero returns otherwise would occur frequently. 
3.4 Results 
In this section we report and discuss our experimental findings. Our focus is on the play-
ers’ ex ante behavior, namely, their preferences for a certain contract design (Sections 
3.4.1 and 3.4.2). Findings on repayment and allocative outcomes will be reported in Sec-
tion 3.4.3. Besides showing descriptive results, we mainly rely on regression analysis.
33
 
Table 3.2 summarizes descriptive statistics for our major findings and selected socio-
demographic variables. 
                                                 
33
 In experimental research, commonly non-parametric tests (e.g., Mann–Whitney U test) are used for com-
paring the outcomes between treatments. These tests, however, are run based on entirely independent obser-
vations. Due to our stranger-matching protocol, conservatively speaking, we only obtain six (HIGH and 
LOW), respectively three (NO SHOCK), independent observations per condition. Even though other studies 
with a comparable number of sessions do not refrain from using non-parametric tests, we believe that the 
number of observations is insufficient to reliably test hypotheses using this method. Therefore, we run re-
gressions at the participant level controlling for cluster-correlated standard errors at the session (i.e., inde-
pendent observation) level. 
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3.4.1 Preferences for contract flexibility I: contract offers 
We start by analyzing the principal’s behavior. As the descriptive results in Table 3.2 re-
veal, contract offers by the principal—and thus the willingness to send all points to the 
agent—are with 58–77 percent well above the theoretical prediction of zero offers. This is 
especially remarkable as players have to send their entire endowment and survey results 
indicate a very low level of general trust in others.
34
 In the LOW condition the rate of con-
tract offers is significantly higher than in the other two conditions. 
However, unlike examinations of the standard investment game we are not primarily inter-
ested in the general level of trust and interaction, but rather in the endogenous choice of 
contract design. Generally speaking, two out of three agreements offered by a principal are 
flexible. The share of flexible agreements in the HIGH condition is 73 percent and thus, as 
predicted by our first hypothesis, higher than the share in the other conditions (around 64 
percent). 
The results of different probit regressions reported in Table 3.3 largely confirm these de-
scriptive findings. In all specifications, Flexible contract is the dependent variable, taking 
the value of 1 if an offered agreement is flexible and 0 if it is rigid. The estimates suggest 
that the offer of a flexible contract is significantly more likely in the HIGH relative to the 
LOW condition (LOW is the omitted category in all regressions). Yet, the magnitude of the 
average marginal effect of HIGH ranges between 8 and 11 percentage points, when con-
sidering all eight periods (models (1) to (4)), and is thus not very large. 
                                                 
34
 As a matter of fact, 98 percent of respondents answered the question “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” with “Need to be 
very careful”. 
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One potential explanation for the relatively small effect size is that we use a between-
subject design, implying that individuals are not able to compare risk levels. Vice versa, if 
the same subject witnessed a gradual increase in risk, the treatment effect would likely be 
larger due to the existence of reference values.
35
 Another potential reason is alignment. It 
takes time for a subject to learn the optimal (or presumably optimal) behavior within the 
course of a session. Since for a principal the risk of a bad state and the strategic risk of an 
agent acting opportunistically co-exist (cf. Section 3.2.2), she certainly requires some peri-
ods to shape expectations, in particular, about the latter form of risk. In the second half of 
periods, when principals are more experienced with the game and have formed specific 
expectations about agents’ behavior, the HIGH–LOW difference becomes larger and more 
significant. Models (5) and (6) in Table 3.3 consider only periods 5–8, where a principal, 
who is willing to send points, is (on the average) up to 24 percentage points more likely to 
offer a flexible contract in the HIGH compared to a principal in the LOW condition. Yet, 
we find no difference between the LOW and NO SHOCK conditions.  
Models (1) to (5) additionally reveal a slight general decrease of offered contract flexibility 
over time. In model (3) we add interaction terms of the condition dummies and Period.
36
 
The coefficient of HIGH × Period suggests that the decrease over time is smaller for the 
HIGH condition, but this result is not significant. 
 
                                                 
35
 We decided to vary the level of risk only between conditions, because the inclusion of different probabili-
ties within conditions would have increased the complexity of the experiment. 
36
 We refrain from reporting marginal effects for probit regressions with interaction terms, as they do not 
correspond with the true interaction effects in nonlinear models (Ai and Norton, 2003). 
 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3. Risky environments, hidden knowledge, and preferences for contract flexibility 
  
83 
Moreover, model (4) contains an explanatory variable on stated risk preference. The varia-
ble takes a value between 1 and 5, depending on how much the subject agreed with the 
statement “I would invest part of my income if there is a chance that this amount doubles, 
but also that I lose everything” on a 5-point Likert scale. The coefficient is significant at 
the 5-percent level, suggesting that the likelihood of an offered contract being flexible in-
creases with decreasing risk aversion. We also find that, controlling for risk preference, the 
coefficients and marginal effects of HIGH, NO SHOCK and Period do not change consid-
erably compared to model (2). 
Result 1: The majority of offered agreements are flexible. Principals are significantly more likely 
to offer flexible contracts in the high-risk environment compared to the condition with low proba-
bility of a shock. The effect becomes particularly strong in the second half of a session when prin-
cipals have formed expectations about the agents’ behavior. This confirms part of hypothesis 1. 
However, there is no difference between the LOW and NO SHOCK condition. 
3.4.2 Preferences for contract flexibility II: contract acceptance 
We now turn to the agent’s behavior and, to begin with, her decision about signing or re-
jecting a contract offer. Our descriptive results in Table 3.2 indicate that 82–86 percent of 
all offers are being accepted, without significant differences between conditions. This is 
somewhat below the theoretical agent’s best response of signing every contract irrespective 
of the condition. Figure 3.1 suggests that agents have a higher propensity to sign flexible 
compared to rigid agreements in the conditions with a potential bad state (HIGH and 
LOW). There is no such discrimination between contract types in the NO SHOCK condi-
tion. 
 




Figure 3.1:  Signed flexible and rigid agreements by agents (as share of respective offers of this 
contract type in a condition) 
The regression results in Table 3.4 confirm the descriptive findings. Estimated models are 
probit regressions with contract acceptance as dependent variable, taking a value of 1 if an 
agreement is signed by an agent and 0 otherwise. We do not find a difference in contract 
acceptance between the conditions. Acceptance in general (independent of contract type) 
increases over time at a very marginal rate and flexible agreements are more likely to be 
signed by an agent relative to rigid ones. The latter finding is significantly smaller and 
even seems to vanish for the NO SHOCK treatment (model (2)), as also apparent in Fig-
ure 3.1. The preference for flexible contracts in the LOW and HIGH conditions is plausi-
ble, if agents fear rigid terms of repayment and harsh sanctioning in the event of a shock 
(even though based on the expected payoff they should accept rigid contracts as well). 
When no shock can occur by design, there is also no risk for the agent to lose anything, 
which is reflected in the lack of discrimination between contract types in the NO SHOCK 
condition.  
In addition, hypothesis 2 predicts an agent’s particular reluctance to sign a rigid agreement 
when the probability of a bad state is high. Based on our data, we cannot confirm this part 
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statistically significant, suggesting that preferences for flexible agreements of agent players 
in the high-risk environment are not different from those in the low-risk condition. 
Table 3.4:  Probability of contract acceptance by agents 
 
Result 2: Agents are more likely to sign a flexible contract relative to a rigid one in environments 
that exhibit a general risk of shock. They fear principals’ retaliation if a bad state prevents them 
from complying with the contract terms, given that knowledge of the shock is hidden. This confirms 
part of hypothesis 2. However, we cannot find evidence for the conjecture that agents are particu-
larly reluctant to sign rigid agreements when risk is high. 
 Dep. Variable: Contract acceptance 
 (1) ME (2)
1
 (3) ME 
HIGH 






















































































No  No Yes  
Control for small 
session 
Yes  Yes Yes  
N 628  628 628  
Pseudo R² .057  .069 .110  
Notes: Table shows results for probit regressions; LOW is the omitted treatment; ro-
bust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering at the session level; 
ME columns report the average marginal effects (dy/dx); socio-demographic controls 
include variables on age, gender, education, employment, marital status and number of 
children; small session dummy is 1 if number of subjects attending the session < 16, 
and 0 if number of subjects ≥ 16 (i.e., perfect stranger matching is possible); 
***
 indi-
cates significance at 1%, and 
**
 significance at the 5% level 
1
 We are not estimating marginal effects for this model as it contains interaction terms. 


































good state bad state
flexible
rigid
3.4.3 Contractual flexibility, opportunistic behavior, and benefits from interaction 
In this section we analyze the agents’ post-contractual behavior as well as the contractual 
outcome for both players. Since repayment options for the agent differ between the con-
tract designs (that is, they are very restricted with a rigid and very numerous with a flexible 
agreement) a direct comparison of repayment averages is, strictly speaking, not possible. 
Therefore, Figure 3.2 depicts agents’ repayment of more than zero (panel (a)) and of 
20 points or more (panel (b)) for the various states and contract types. For the rigid con-
tract, of course, both panels are congruent. It confirms our intuition that agents more often 
return “at least something” with flexible agreements (panel (a)). This holds true for both 
states, even though the difference between contract designs is larger when the state is bad. 
At the same time, however, full compliance with the contract terms is much more frequent 
with rigid agreements (panel (b)). Interestingly, in the case of flexible contracts the differ-






Figure 3.2:  Agents’ return of (a) more than zero and (b) 20 points or more (as share of respective 
interactions with this contract type in a certain state) 
The first part of Table 3.5 shows results of a linear regression with the amount of points 
sent back by the agent as dependent variable. As we are now in the ex post “contract per-
formance stage” and the state-of-nature outcome is known to the agent, we omit variables 
(a) (b) 
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for the different conditions in the regressions. We find a slight decrease in repayment over 
time as well as a significantly higher return rate in a good state. Points sent back by the 
agent do not differ significantly between flexible and rigid contracts. When interpreting 
this result, however, it should be kept in mind that repayment amounts are hardly compa-
rable between the contract types, as pointed out above. 
The finding that agents return more in a good state may be due to various factors. In the 
traditional investment game, the second mover’s choice has typically been interpreted as 
reciprocity. However, given that the state in our game is a result of chance, pure reciprocity 
can only partly explain why agents return more when the state is good; even though one 
could argue that the principal’s decision to offer a contract was a necessary precondition 
for the agent to gain this surplus. In addition, inequity aversion (as according to the famous 
model by Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) as well as a positive income effect on giving, confirmed 
by several studies (e.g., Yen, 2002; Chowdhury and Jeon, 2014), can serve as explanations 
for the positive effect of a good state on repayment (see, e.g., discussion in Johnson and 
Mislin, 2011). We believe that a combination of agents’ other-regarding preferences and 
the high “income” when observing a good state leads to the higher repayment rate—which, 
in fact, is only higher in absolute terms but not relative to productivity. 
The probit models in the second part of Table 3.5 treat negative deviations from a repay-
ment of 20 points (as agreed in the rigid and benchmark in the flexible contract) as a binary 
dependent variable, taking a value of 1 if an agent returned less than 20, and 0 otherwise. 
We find that a return of less than 20 is, on the average, about 30 percentage points more 
likely with a flexible contract. The State of nature coefficient is also significant and nega-
tive, indicating that a good state decreases the likelihood of less-than-20 returns. 
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Yet, these regression models do not provide definite information about the occurrence and 
severity of opportunistic behavior, as they do not allow for differentiating between risk 
sharing and opportunism. We define opportunistic behavior by the agent as a repayment of 
less than 20 points in case of a good state.
37
 This way, we clearly distinguish between use 
and abuse of contract flexibility. 
Consequently, the regressions in the third part of Table 3.5 use the dummy Opportunistic 
behavior as dependent variable, taking a value of 1 if an agent acted opportunistically ac-
cording to the aforementioned definition and 0 if repayment was at least 20 or less than 20 
in a bad state. We find that an agent is about 23 percentage points more likely to act oppor-
tunistically if a flexible agreement is being used.
38
 
Result 3: We confirm hypothesis 3 that agents fail significantly more often to return 20 points with 
flexible agreements. Similarly, opportunistic behavior (defined as a return of less than 20 in a good 
state) is more likely if interaction is facilitated by flexible contracts—although agents more often 
return at least some positive amount irrespective of the state. Evidently, the repayment amount is 
positively associated with a good state of nature and agents, to some extent, share a surplus. 
Before we turn to the contractual outcomes and payoffs, we should stress that this study is 
not about optimal contracts. In Section 3.2.2 we argue that we deliberately choose an ex-
treme form of flexibility and an easy setting of sequential exchange. Evidently, both con-
tract designs are rather unfavorable for the principal and therefore not very likely to be 
                                                 
37
 We could extend this definition by including returns of less than 10 points in a bad state. This would only 
marginally change our regression results in Table 3.5 (models (6) and (7)). 
38
 All estimated models in Table 3.5 remain robust if we include dummies for the six main ethnic groups—
Luo, Luhya, Nubian, Kisii, Kikuyu and Kamba—represented in our experiment. In total, 230 of our 240 
participants (96 percent) belong to one of these six ethnicities. We do not find any significant differences 
between subjects from different ethnicities regarding repayment amounts, return of less than 20, or opportun-
istic behavior. 
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selected for real-world exchange.
39
 The absolute performance of the two agreements is 
thus not of primary interest to us. Instead, we pay more attention to the comparison of the 
two contract types in the given situation. 
Figure 3.3 plots the players’ average payoffs in case a contract was concluded. While pan-
el (a) reveals that sending points barely pays for the principal—a fact often observed in 
investment games (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003; Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008)—panel (b) 
suggests that agents derive substantial benefits from interaction. Moreover, we find that 
agents’ mean payoff from exchange decreases with increasing risk level and that across all 
conditions they are better off with flexible agreements. This latter observation is partly due 
to the fact that principals retaliate in 83–97 percent of the cases when agents breach a rigid 
contract (cf. Table 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.3:  Mean payoffs of (a) principal, (b) agent and (c) mean total payoffs of both players (in 
case of interaction) 
Panel (c) illustrates the total surplus both players could realize through interaction in the 
various conditions. Besides the negative welfare effect of production shocks, indicated by 
the changes in total payoff between conditions, an efficiency loss with contractual rigidity 
                                                 
39
 See the introduction in Hart (1995) for a nice illustration of why it is important that contracts allow for a 
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becomes evident. This loss originates from the frequent retaliation and is also very likely in 
real-world exchange if an ex post adjustment of contract terms is completely ruled out. 
More often than not, subjects retaliate at the expense of total welfare—and other studies on 
cooperation show that this result holds even if retaliation is costly to the punisher (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2002). 
Result 4: We have to reject hypothesis 4 that both players benefit from contract flexibility in the 
high-risk environment. The agent indeed does, but so she does in the other conditions. For the 
principal, if sending points at all, rigid agreements are always superior. At the same time, rigid 
agreements lead to substantial welfare losses as principals extensively retaliate against reneging 
agents. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Contract flexibility can support exchange in risky environments, but also encourage post-
contractual opportunism. In an artefactual field experiment with slum dwellers in Nairobi, 
Kenya, we investigate preferences for contract flexibility, when subjects face different lev-
els of risk and the common problem of hidden knowledge. Moreover, we examine the oc-
currence of opportunistic behavior and the contractual outcomes for both parties. 
Our main contribution is to show that strong preferences for flexibility exist among slum 
dwellers and they become even stronger in a high-risk environment (compared to a low-
risk). This is no surprise in the agent’s case. Yet, considering that the principal is doing 
worse with a flexible agreement in all conditions and opportunistic behavior by the agent is 
encouraged, the question remains why offering flexibility is this prevalent after all. 
One explanation could be the existence of corresponding social norms. Offering rigid ex-
change without flexibility but with the threat of punishment may be considered rude. This 
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argument becomes flimsy against the backdrop of the heavy actual retaliation we observe. 
A second potential explanation is that principals, analogously to the wage premium in a 
gift-exchange game, hope to trigger positive reciprocity by offering a flexible contract. 
Similarly, anticipated “hidden costs of control”, as reported by Falk and Kosfeld (2006), 
could have restrained subjects from using rigid contracts. Yet, the high amount of points 
being controlled in our study and the possible retaliation imply that these control costs are 
small if not negligible. Note, though, that none of these arguments can explain the differ-
ences between conditions. 
Our findings do not only shed light on real behavior and actual preferences in developing 
countries’ informal markets, but also suggest some implications for the design of contracts 
(or implicit agreements) in environments where hazards and information problems are 
ubiquitous. Accordingly, contracts should take account of the strong preferences and need 
for flexibility we observe in our controlled experiment. Without flexibility economic ex-
change is less likely to occur, which, in turn, can result in welfare losses. Nonetheless, to 
mitigate post-contractual opportunism and make contract flexibility beneficial for both 
parties, these agreements must allow for a more elaborated sharing of ex post control. 
Also from a policy perspective it is a noteworthy fact that flexibility may be desirable to 
facilitate exchange, but is easily exploited. Solutions thus need to target a stronger sym-
metry of information in markets (e.g., through monitoring or networks). When shocks are 
likely, flexibility is preferable to institutions that rigidly enforce all contracts and, that way, 
ignore the risk-sharing capability and welfare potential of contract flexibility.
40
 In envi-
ronments where third-party enforcement is ruled out, private institutions—designed or 
spontaneously arising—may take over the task of information provision. We found that 
                                                 
40
 In fact, this positive effect on efficiency is twofold: First, we find that flexible contracts encourage interac-
tion and thus the possible creation of gains. Second, no resources are being wasted by means of retaliation. 
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hidden knowledge does not prevent exchange and interaction altogether, but mere flexibil-
ity seems not sufficient to achieve a fair division of a surplus. 
There are at least three aspects of contract flexibility that we ignore in our study but ought 
to briefly mention at this point. First, the literature often associates flexibility with long-
term relationships. Indeed, relational contracts, in the sense of a repeated game, would be 
likely to discourage opportunism to a certain degree (see, e.g., Kunte, Wollni and Keser, 
2014 or Chapter 2 in this dissertation) and thus highlight the risk-sharing function of flexi-
ble agreements. As we intended to examine the pure link between risk and contract flexi-
bility, we tried to avoid reputational effects. Second, the opportunity for communication 
may alter the efficiency of flexible agreements. Brandts, Charness and Ellman (2012) show 
that contract flexibility coincides with less grievance and better outcomes if unrestricted 
communication between contracting parties is possible. Third, and related, a proper rene-
gotiation that is ad hoc and different from our unconditional flexibility is indeed more 
promising for solving hidden knowledge problems of the kind introduced in this study. We 
must leave it to future research to take these aspects into account. 
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Thank you very much for joining this study! 
You will participate in an economic experiment that studies behavior for scientific purposes. Please 
carefully follow the instructions below. 
We play a game in which you will earn money. How much you earn depends on your own deci-
sions and on the decisions by other players. Henceforth, please do not talk to other participants, 
keep your phone switched off and do not read any magazines or books you might have brought. 
In this game, two players have the opportunity to interact, called Player 1 (P1) and Player 2 (P2). 
Both players will receive 10 points at the beginning of each round. Points are worth real money and 
both players may increase their points when they interact. P1 can send his points to P2. The points 
sent will triple (in a good state) or remain unchanged (in a bad state). Only P2 can observe this 
state. Then, P2 can return points to P1. For a transaction, both players will conclude a blue or yel-
low agreement (described below). 
 
The decisions: 
The two players can face the following (5) decisions in each round of the game [ handout]. 
(1) P1 decides if he wants to interact with P2 in this round and send him all 10 points. If not, 
both players keep their 10 points and this round is finished. If so, P1 chooses a blue 
agreement or a yellow agreement for this transaction (described in the boxes below).  
(2) If an agreement is offered, P2 decides if he accepts it. If not, both players keep their 10 
points and this round is finished. If so, the transaction takes place. 
(3) If an agreement was offered and accepted, P2 observes if the state is good or bad. If he 
observes a good state, the points sent by P1 are tripled and P2 now owns 40 points (his 
own 10 points + the tripled points sent by P1). If he observes a bad state, the points sent 
by P1 remain unchanged and P2 now owns 20 points (his own 10 points + the 10 points 
sent by P1). P1 cannot observe how many points P2 now owns. 
(4) P2 decides how many points he sends back to P1. In case a yellow agreement was con-
cluded, he can only choose between sending back a fixed amount of 20 points or nothing 
(0 points). In case a blue agreement was concluded, he can send back also any different 
amount (more or less than 20 points). 
                                                 
*
 This material refers to the HIGH condition. For the other conditions only relevant elements changed (e.g., 
shock probability), everything else remained the same. Translated to Swahili, the instructions were read 
aloud to the participants while they received an English handout (see below) with important elements of the 
game. Comprehension questions had to be answered using the computer, giving participants an immediate 
feedback; as the screen was locked following a wrong answer, pure guesswork was impossible. The Swahili 
instructions and the material of the other conditions will be provided upon request. 
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(5) P1 observes how many points P2 returned to him. If a yellow agreement was chosen and 
the repayment is zero, P1 can now delete 15 of P2’s points. However, this does not alter 
P1’s points. If a blue agreement was chosen, P1 accepts the points sent by P2. 
 
The agreements: 
The interaction and transfer of points is realized through a blue or a yellow agreement. P1 decides 
which type of agreement he offers P2. Both agreements include different terms of repayment [ 
handout]. Before we start with the study, please make sure that you have understood the differences 








Good or bad state: 
If P2 observes a good state, the 10 points sent by P1 are tripled. If P2 observes a bad state, the 
points remain unchanged. Only P2 can observe this state, P1 is not informed about it. That means, 
after P1 sent his points, P2 owns either 20 points or 40 points, but P1 does not know this amount. 
The computer determines if the state is good or bad. 
 There is a chance of 50 % that the state is good. 
 There is a chance of 50 % that the state is bad. 
To get a better idea of the chances, consider the following picture of a bag containing 10 balls [ 
handout]. 5 of these balls are green and 5 are red. Imagine now, you draw one ball without looking 
into the bag. The chances of getting a green or red ball are the same as for a good or bad state (50 






With a blue agreement, repayment is considered a flexible amount and P2 is allowed to send 
back also more or less than 20 points depending on the state (Remember: P1 cannot observe this 
state). 
 
With a yellow agreement, repayment is considered a fixed amount and P2 can only send back 20 
points or nothing. If he does not send points, P1 can decide to delete 15 of P2’s points (Remem-
ber: if a bad state occurs, P2 only owns 20 points in total and must send everything he owns to 
comply with the agreement). 
 




In each round, you will keep the points you earned. That means 
 if no interaction took place, both players keep their 10 points. 
 if an interaction took place, P1 earns the points sent back to him; P2 earns the points 
not sent back. 
 in case a yellow agreement was concluded and P2 does not return points, P1 can de-
lete 15 of P2’s points. 
In the end of the study, the points from all rounds (excluding the two practice rounds) are summed 
up and exchanged to Kenyan Shilling according to the following rate: 
 
1 point = 2 KSh 
 
This amount will be added to the payment of 200 KSh for participation and transferred to your 
cellphone via mPESA after this session. 
You will first play the game for two practice rounds. These rounds are only meant to support your 
understanding of the different decisions, the outcome will not affect your payment. After the two 
practice rounds, the game is played for eight “real” rounds in which you can earn money. You will 
keep your role (P1 or P2) throughout the whole game. 
In the eight “real” rounds, you will interact with different players. No one will learn the identity of 
the other players during or after the study. Thus, decisions and earnings cannot be attributed to a 
specific participant. 
All interactions are facilitated by computers. In the course of the game, you will face different 
screens that either ask you to take a decision yourself or inform you about other decisions. For tak-
ing own decisions, you need to push labeled buttons on the touch screen in front of you. For numer-
ical entries a number pad will appear. If information is provided, you may push the “OK” button to 
proceed. 
Before we start with the actual study, you are now asked to answer a few questions to prove full 
comprehension of the instructions. 
 
 
Thanks again for your participation! 
  
 











Please answer the following questions. They are only meant to support your understanding of 
the game and will not directly influence your payment. 
 
 
1. How many points does each player own at the 
beginning of a round? 
0 40 20 30 10 
 
2. If Player 1 sends all points and a GOOD state 
occurs, how many points does Player 2 now own? 
20 40 10 0 30 
 
3. If Player 1 sends all points and a BAD state oc-
curs, how many points does Player 2 now own? 
20 40 10 0 30 
 
4. With a yellow agreement, what can Player 1 do if 
Player 2 sent back nothing? 
Delete points Tell other players 
 
5. Is it true that Player 1 cannot observe if the state is 
good or bad? 
Yes No 
 
6. Player 2 can send back also more or less than 20 
points with a ... 
blue agreement yellow agreement 
 
7. Player 2 can send back only 20 points or nothing 
with a ... 
blue agreement yellow agreement 
 
8. What are the chances that a BAD state occurs? 10 % 50 % 
 
9. What are the chances that a GOOD state occurs? 10 % 50 % 
 
10. Who is setting this state? Player 2 The computer 
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4. Do inequalities in profit reinforce post-contractual opportunism? 
Experimental evidence from a slum in Nairobi 
Abstract.—Even though many informal settlements exhibit vibrant economic activity, 
behavioral patterns and preferences of slum dwellers are not well understood. We run a 
lab-in-the-field experiment with subjects from the Kibera slum in Nairobi, Kenya. In a 
simple principal–agent game with hidden action we study if rejection rates and post-
contractual opportunism increase when a contracting party can observe large (disadvanta-
geous) differences in profit from trade. Along the lines of inequity aversion theory, we 
argue that the feeling of being treated unfairly in an exchange relationship may trigger un-
cooperative responses. Our results do not confirm this and rather show a very high compli-
ance rate in general. Rejections and opportunistic behavior are not reinforced by profit 
asymmetries. Yet, we do find significant gender effects. Experimental and survey out-
comes jointly suggest a low level of inequity aversion among Nairobi slum dwellers. 
 
Keywords: principal–agent theory, hidden action, lab-in-the-field experiment, inequity aversion, 
post-contractual opportunism, Nairobi slum, Kenya 
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Informal settlements in developing countries often exhibit vibrant economic activity. An 
article by The Economist (2012) attests that the Kibera slum in Nairobi, Kenya, “may be 
the most entrepreneurial place on the planet” and “an African version of a Chinese 
boomtown, an advertisement for solid human ambition”. Given this dynamic economic 
landscape with its myriad small businesses, adaptive capacity and essential flexibility, re-
markably little research has yet been done on patterns of economic behavior and prefer-
ences of slum dwellers. 
This also and particularly applies to principal–agent arrangements. Many of these relations, 
which might be embedded in larger value chains or organizations, are characterized by 
strongly asymmetric gains from trade. Simultaneously, low-income countries often suffer 
from an inefficient legal system or do not provide access to public enforcement institutions 
to all citizens (World Bank, 2013a; ibid., 2013b). This makes opportunistic behavior—in 
one form or another—an impending and often existent problem in bilateral trade. 
The main question underlying this lab-in-the-field experiment is whether post-contractual 
opportunism is reinforced when a producer observes large differences in profits between 
herself and the buyer. More precisely, in a contractual relation where deviating from cer-
tain contract terms is a potentially profitable strategy for the producer and her actions are 
hidden, how will the knowledge of the buyer’s gains from trade affect the producer’s be-
havior within the relationship? The investigation of this question is of particular interest in 
a developing country context where we assume the necessity to largely rely on private en-
forcement mechanisms (e.g., McMillan and Woodruff, 2000; Fafchamps, 2004), but can 
also provide general insights into agents’ other-regarding behavior in bilateral contractual 
relations. 
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We run our experiment with individuals from various villages of the Kibera slum, a popu-
lation that is highly relevant for at least three reasons. First, many slum dwellers are casual 
workers or produce goods on behalf of others (Government of Kenya and UN-HABITAT, 
2005). Hence, the decisions taken in our game are likely to also play a critical role in par-
ticipants’ everyday life. Second, they are constantly confronted with high inequality in 
wealth and income, which might alter their notion of inequity and their other-regarding 
preferences. And third, the Kibera population is vastly familiar with institutional failures 
when it comes to the protection of property rights and contract enforcement (Joireman and 
Vanderpoel, 2010). 
We play a very simplified, one-shot principal–agent game with hidden action, in which the 
producer can accept a contract and has the choice between two activities: to invest in quali-
ty (and comply with the contract terms) or to refrain from investing. The buyer cannot di-
rectly observe the investment, only the quality outcome, which is more likely to be high if 
the producer invested. Both players’ payoffs depend on this quality. Our treatment variable 
is the buyer’s profit or, respectively, the producer’s knowledge thereof. 
Rational and selfish individuals are thought to only care about their own profit and not to 
alter their behavior when the other party’s payoff changes. Yet, a fair-minded producer 
might be more likely to renege on the contract when knowing that the buyer earns much 
more from this interaction relative to a setting where profit differences are small or un-
known. In the former case, the producer dislikes the existing inequality and feels exploited. 
In addition, the perceived heterogeneous gains from trade may cause first-party enforce-
ment mechanisms (e.g., guilt feelings) to fail. 
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In this vein, other-regarding behavior is central to our experiment.
41
 However, we are not 
examining the division of a surplus, but decisions taken prior to a chance move. Popular 
theories of distributional preferences and fairness (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) should thus be applied with caution. Nonethe-
less, these theories can support the formulation of different hypotheses on producers’ be-
havior and help interpreting the results. 
Most experimental examinations of principal–agent relations that are related to our study 
and exclusively conducted with students in Western countries
42
 (e.g., Keser and Willinger, 
2000; ibid., 2007; Anderhub, Gächter and Königstein, 2002; Cochard and Willinger, 2003) 
emphasize the problem of designing an optimal incentive contract. That is, they primarily 
focus on the principal’s behavior. Perhaps the most remarkable and consistent finding from 
these controlled experiments is that offered contracts by and large follow norms of fair 
surplus sharing. Closely related experiments on “gift exchange” stress that higher fixed 
payments by principals trigger reciprocal responses by agents who, in return, apply higher 
effort levels (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; 
Fehr, Klein and Schmidt, 2007; Kube, Maréchal and Puppe, 2012). This evidence on reci-
procity is robust. Yet, little is known about the pure effect of profit inequalities on the 
agent’s behavior. By only studying the producer’s decisions and exogenously determining 
surplus sharing, our design allows us to exclude the effect of reciprocity. In addition, stud-
ies on agents’ behavior using non-student and non-Western subjects are sparse. For the 
aforementioned reasons, we believe that behavior in our study population substantially 
deviates from that of students. 
                                                 
41
 To be precise with theoretical terminology, we address inequality or inequity aversion (both terms are used 
in the literature) as one form of social preferences, i.e. an individual’s utility depends on her material payoff, 
but also on the payoff of others. “Other-regarding preferences” can be understood as a general category in-
cluding also interdependent and intention-based preferences (cf. Fehr and Schmidt, 2006 for a classification). 
42
 An exception is the study of trust games with hidden action conducted by Binzel and Fehr (2013) in Cairo. 
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The next section introduces a simple agency problem with hidden action. Section 4.3 ex-
plains the experimental design, procedures and different theoretical predictions. Sec-
tion 4.4 briefly summarizes the study’s results. In Section 4.5 we discuss our findings and 
conclude. 
4.2 A simple agency problem 
In this section we briefly introduce a simple form of an agency problem with hidden action 
(based on Hart, 1995). Imagine there is one buyer (principal) and one producer (agent) who 
can conclude a contract for production and purchase of a good with quality 𝑞, where 
𝑞 = 𝑓(𝑖, 𝜃). 
That is, the good’s quality is a function of the producer’s activity 𝑖 (namely, an investment 
in this quality) and some random factor 𝜃 which is beyond the producer’s control. The 
producer has costs of investment 𝑐(𝑖), which are usually assumed to be convex, i.e., 
𝑐′(𝑖) > 0 and 𝑐′′(𝑖) > 0. Here we simplify the producer’s activity to a binary choice of 
investing or not investing in quality, 𝑖 ∈  0,1 . We thus assume 𝑐(𝑖 = 0) = 0 and        
𝑐(𝑖 = 0) < 𝑐(𝑖 = 1). 
The buyer’s valuation and profit from trade directly depend on the good’s quality 𝑞, thus 
𝜋(𝑞). The producer exhibits a utility function of  
𝑢(𝑝, 𝑖) = 𝑉(𝑝) − 𝑐(𝑖), 
where 𝑝 is the payment the producer receives for the good. 
The hidden action problem now emerges from the fact that 𝑖 is unobservable to the buyer 
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er’s demanded investment level. Instead of offering a fixed-payment contract of 𝑝∗, that 
would shift all risk to the buyer but eliminate the producer’s pecuniary incentives to invest, 
the buyer can offer an incentive scheme in the form of 𝑝 = 𝑝(𝑞). Note that this is possible 
since the outcome of 𝑞 is commonly known. The canonical principal–agent approach is 
mostly concerned with the principal’s (buyer’s) design of an optimal contract in the form 
of  
𝑝 = 𝜏 + 𝑠(𝑞),  
where 𝜏 is a fixed payment and 𝑠 is a share of the produced surplus or, as in our case, a 
bonus for high quality. 
With an incentive scheme of this form, the producer has a general stimulus to invest in 
quality. Whether or not the incentive is sufficient depends on the particular design of the 
scheme.
43
 In this study, we ignore the buyer’s contractual design choice and exogenously 
determine a scheme contracting parties will use. Our parameters are introduced in the next 
section. 
4.3 The experiment 
4.3.1 Design 
We ran our experiment in the premises of the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics in 
Nairobi, Kenya, which provides a full laboratory with touchscreen computers (for details 
see Haushofer et al., 2014). Subjects were randomly recruited from a pool of about 2,500 
                                                 
43
 Typically, the buyer maximizes her expected profit 𝐸(𝜋) = 𝑟(𝑓(𝑖, 𝜃)) − 𝑝(𝑓(𝑖, 𝜃)), where 𝑟(∙) is her 
revenue function and 𝑝(∙) the payment to the producer, both depend on the quality outcome, subject to the 
producer’s “participation constraint” and “incentive compatibility constraint”. The former assures that 
𝐸[𝑉(𝑝(∙))] − 𝑐(𝑖) at least equals the producer’s reservation utility; the latter states that 𝐸[𝑉(𝑝(∙))] − 𝑐(𝑖) is 
increasing in 𝑖. 
(4.3) 
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residents from the Kibera slum, Nairobi’s largest informal settlement, and invited via SMS. 
As an understanding of probabilities is important to our study, participants were required to 
have a minimum education level of completed primary school. 
In a session, all subjects but one assume the role of a producer; one randomly chosen par-
ticipant is the buyer. The buyer in our study is a dummy player and does not take any ac-
tive decisions. However, her payoff is affected by the producers’ actions. 
We play a very simplified and adjusted principal–agent game with hidden action. In a first 
stage, a producer decides whether to enter into a contract with the buyer (which is automat-
ically offered). By accepting, the producer agrees to deliver her product and promises to 
invest in high quality. If no contract is concluded, both receive a reservation payoff of 20.
44
 
In the second stage, the producer decides on the actual investment 𝑖 ∈  0,1 . The invest-
ment comes at a cost of 𝑐(𝑖 = 1) = 20, but increases the probability of a high-quality 
product from 𝑃(𝑞 = 1 | 𝑖 = 0) = 0.5 to 𝑃(𝑞 = 1 | 𝑖 = 1) = 0.8. In the last stage, a com-
puterized random device determines the quality level 𝑞 ∈  0,1  (where 0 stands for low 
and 1 for high quality) contingent on whether or not the producer invested. 
Analogously to the agency problem outlined in Section 4.2, the eventual quality outcome 
can be observed and thus the producer’s payment made contingent on this outcome. Yet, 
the buyer cannot observe the action chosen by the seller, but nonetheless demand a (non-
enforceable) activity in the contract.
45
 
                                                 
44
 Payoffs and costs are all expressed in monetary units of Kenyan Shillings (KES). At the time of the study 
USD 1 was worth approximately KES 88. Earnings should be interpreted relative to participants’ average 
daily income, which is KES 160 according to our post-experimental survey for the full sample. 
45
 This demanded activity is the equivalent of the desired effort level ?̃? in some gift-exchange experiments 
(e.g., Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997). While the agent’s effort choice of 𝑒 < ?̃? is usually interpreted as 
“shirking”, we understand an investment decision of 𝑖 = 0 as “opportunistic behavior”. 
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With a high-quality product a producer receives a payment of 𝑝(𝑞 = 1) = 80 minus the 
possible investment cost 𝑐(𝑖); with low quality the producer receives 𝑝(𝑞 = 0) = 40 mi-
nus the investment. The buyer’s profit 𝜋, in turn, does not depend on an investment but 
solely on the quality of the final product. The buyer earns 𝜋(𝑞 = 1) = 𝜑 with high quality 
and 𝜋(𝑞 = 0) =
𝜑
2
 if a low quality product is delivered.
46
 Table 4.1 summarizes the param-
eters and payoffs. 
Table 4.1:  Experimental parameters and payoffs 
 
We use a between-subjects design to compare contract acceptance and compliance in three 
different conditions. In the first condition, where 𝜑 = 60, both producer and buyer earn 
about the same amount. More precisely, they benefit from trade equally if the producer 
complies and the quality is high. Expected payoffs are almost the same with investment (52 
for the producer vs. 54 for the buyer). This can be labeled the symmetric (SYM) condition. 
In the second, 𝜑 = 240 and the producer knows that the buyer earns up to four times the 
own amount (ASYM). To analyze whether the actual knowledge of the other’s payoff has 
an effect, we conduct sessions with non-transparency regarding the buyer’s earnings. Pro-
                                                 
46
 As we are not interested in buyer behavior and to keep the game as simple as possible, the buyer’s profit is 
only composed of one parameter (instead of a profit function). We can assume that this parameter is already 
reduced by the payment to the producer. More than a realistic profit function, it is important here to make the 
height of the payoff very prominent. 
 
high quality 
(𝑞 = 1) 
low quality 
(𝑞 = 0) 
Probability if 𝑖 = 0 0.5 0.5 
Probability if 𝑖 = 1 0.8 0.2 
Buyer’s payoff (𝜋) 𝜑 𝜑 2  
Producer’s payoff (𝑢) 80 − 𝑐(𝑖) 40 − 𝑐(𝑖) 
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ducers are only informed that the buyer’s payoff with low quality is merely half the payoff 




In total, 240 participants attended 15 experimental sessions; no one more than one session. 
We conducted six sessions of the SYM, six sessions of the ASYM, and three of the UN-
KNOWN condition. Upon arrival, subjects are identified via fingerprint and receive a first 
briefing in a waiting room as well as a random place card indicating their respective com-
puter booth. After being seated, every participant was asked to fill a consent form and 
completed a brief touchscreen test to prove the ability to sufficiently handle the computer. 
We played two different games in a session of which the first is part of Chapter 3 in this 
dissertation.
48
 Instructions were read aloud and explained in Swahili, while participants 
received a handout with graphical illustrations of probabilities, decisions and payoffs in 
English. After these explanations, participants were asked to complete a number of com-
prehension questions at the computer. Research assistants were present at all time to sup-
port subjects who had trouble continuing. As the game itself, these questions were pro-
grammed using the software package z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In case of a wrong an-
swer, subjects had to call a research assistant to “unlock” the screen and explain the ques-
tion again. This improved understanding and made pure guesswork impossible (see Ap-
pendix 4B for instructions and comprehension questions). 
                                                 
47
 In the UNKNOWN condition, the buyer de facto had the same payoff structure as in the SYM (𝜑 = 60). 
The buyer was informed about this individually at the beginning of the game through a screen message. 
48
 To largely avoid influences by the first-game results on behavior in the second game, instructors empha-
sized in between that the second experiment is completely independent and earnings cannot be lost. Moreo-
ver, participants were informed about their total monetary outcome only after the second game. When run-
ning regressions, we additionally control for first-experiment earnings and player type. We will further dis-
cuss this issue in the results section. 
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Following this comprehension survey, all subjects in the role of a producer took their deci-
sions and were informed about their results and payment. The buyer received the outcome 
from interaction with one randomly determined producer; this was explained to everyone 
beforehand. On the average, a participant earned KES 53 for this short experiment, in addi-
tion to a show-up fee of KES 200 and the earnings from the other game (cf. Chapter 3).  
4.3.3 Theoretical predictions 
Game and parameters are chosen such that an incentive contract is offered and both players 
benefit from high quality. For a risk-neutral producer
49
, however, the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint is not satisfied (as shown below). This creates a dilemma between compli-
ance and maximizing the expected profit—and provides monetary incentives to act oppor-
tunistically. Different theories of standard and behavioral economics potentially predict 
different outcomes of the experiment. 
Selfishness. If we assume that individuals are entirely self-interested, they exhibit no other-
regarding behavior and only care about their own payoff. Consequently, we should not be 
able to observe differences between conditions. In addition, a rational producer will not 
invest, even though she and the buyer have the same goal, namely, high quality. The pro-
ducer’s incentive compatibility constraint were satisfied, and investment guaranteed, if 
0.2(40 − 𝑐(𝑖 = 1)) + 0.8(80 − 𝑐(𝑖 = 1)) ≥ 
0.5(40 − 𝑐(𝑖 = 0)) + 0.5(80 − 𝑐(𝑖 = 0)).  
As 𝑐(𝑖 = 1) = 20 and 𝑐(𝑖 = 0) = 0, however, the producer has an expected profit of 52 
with investment and 60 without. As a result, we predict opportunistic behavior and non-
                                                 
49
 To obtain some simple predictions, we assume risk neutrality, even though agency theory is usually assum-
ing the agent to be risk-averse. 
(4.4) 
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investment. Since a contracting producer always earns her reservation payoff of 20 (even 
in the worst case of investment followed by low quality), her participation constraint is 
satisfied and she accepts the contract in the first place. 
Other-regarding preferences. Many experiments show that individuals value their profit in 
relation to that of other players. Assuming other-regarding behavior, we predict a potential-
ly different outcome. There are two (somewhat complementary) “fairness arguments” for 
expecting more opportunism in the ASYM as opposed to the SYM condition. First, if guilt 
aversion is keeping producers from breaking their promise, these guilt feelings may be 
weakened by the impression of being treated unfairly in the ASYM condition. In conse-
quence, subjects behave more in favor of their own (expected) payoff and act less coopera-
tively.
50
 Second, theories of inequity aversion (here we focus on Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) 
assume that the existence of profit asymmetries—disadvantageous but also advanta-
geous
51
—negatively affect an agent’s utility function. In fact, we can show that individuals 
who exhibit Fehr–Schmidt utility functions (and consider expected payoffs) never invest in 
the ASYM, just like selfish individuals do, but possibly switch to investment in the SYM 
condition if they sufficiently dislike being ahead (see Appendix 4A). 
Similarly, even though the producer’s participation constraint is satisfied, we would expect 
more individuals in the ASYM, relative to the SYM or UNKNOWN, to reject the contract 
offer and to prefer a lower (but equal) payoff over a very unequal payoff distribution. This 
prediction can be supported by observations of behavior in ultimatum games. Having said 
that, low-offer rejections in standard ultimatum bargaining games reflect a response to an 
intended act by the proposing player, and acceptance rates of low (“unfair”) offers have 
                                                 
50
 Even though also the producer receives a lower payoff in case of low quality, the buyer in the ASYM 
clearly “loses” much more compared to the high-quality outcome. 
51
 Camerer (2003) refers to these two as “envy” and “guilt”. 
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proven to increase if they were determined randomly or by a third party (Blount, 1995). 
Generally speaking, with our design it is not possible to ascribe the producer’s behavior to 
some kind of reciprocal fairness or use intention-based theories (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), as payoff distributions and contract 
offers are exogenously determined and this is commonly known. This ensures that we ob-
serve the pure effect of profit allocations or, respectively, the knowledge thereof. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics and findings 
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for selected demographic, economic and preference 
variables as well as descriptive results of our outcome variables. A comparison of the 
means suggests that subjects in the different conditions are fairly similar with respect to 
their demographic and economic characteristics. For number of children and monthly in-
come we find some differences between ASYM and UNKNOWN that are significant at the 
10-percent level. Moreover, individuals in the SYM state to use written contracts in every-
day life somewhat more often than their counterparts in the UNKNOWN condition. Yet, 
we also find some differences in inequity aversion and fairness expectations. Risk toler-
ance seems to be significantly higher in the UNKNOWN relative to the other conditions. 
Our descriptive results suggest that the acceptance rate is significantly higher in the ASYM 
(83 of 86 producers accepted the contract) as opposed to the other conditions (SYM: 77 of 
92; UNKNOWN: 40 of 47). Contract compliance (investment) is very high in general. In-
terestingly, it is lowest in the SYM (66 of 77 invested) and rises in the ASYM (77 of 83) 
and UNKNOWN (38 of 40) condition, though these differences in means are not statisti-
cally significant. Consequently, we cannot find differences in producers’ payoffs. 
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), and 10% (
*
) refer to two-sample t tests; 
a 
measures a subject’s average rating of 
her probability to feel guilty and shameful in four specific situations (1 = very unlikely; 7 = very 
likely) based on Cohen et al. (2011); 
b 
response to the statement “Other people should not own 
much more than I do” (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree); 
c 
response to the statement 
“Other people should not own much less than I do” (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree); 
d 
response to the question “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got 
a chance, or would they try to be fair?” (1 = fair); 
e
 response to the statement “I would invest part of 
my income if there is a chance that this amount doubles, but also that I lose everything.” 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
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Table 4.3:  Probability of contract acceptance and investment 
 
 Dep. Variable: Acceptance  Dep. Variable: Investment 
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N 225 222 222 208  200 197 197 187 
Pseudo R² .061 .185 .196 .411  .028 .079 .104 .304 
Notes: Table shows results for probit regressions of producers’ decisions; SYM is the omitted category; robust 
standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering at the session level; 
*** 
indicates significance at 1%, 
** 
significance at 5%, and 
* 
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4.4.2 Regression results 
The results of different probit regression models are reported in Table 4.3. In all specifica-
tions SYM is our omitted category and we control for cluster-correlated standard errors at 
the session level. 
Acceptance. In the first part of Table 4.3, contract acceptance is the dependent variable, 
being 1 if the subject accepted the contract offer and 0 otherwise. Column (1) only includes 
the condition dummies. We find that acceptance is more likely in the ASYM relative to the 
SYM condition, while we cannot find a significant effect of UNKNOWN. In column (2) we 
include variables on age and gender, and control for a subject’s role and earnings in the 
first experiment (part of Chapter 3). Our results show that older subjects and women are 
significantly less likely to accept a contract. The effect of ASYM remains robust. Col-
umn (3) integrates interactions of Female and the condition dummies. It turns out that the 
positive effect of the ASYM condition is significantly larger for males. The gender effect 
becomes insignificant for the omitted SYM condition, indicated by the coefficient of Fe-
male, but considerably grows when subjects observe large differences in profit. In col-
umn (4) we include the other demographic and economic variables as well as the variables 
on preferences and comprehension summarized and explained in Table 4.2. Relative to the 
SYM, contract acceptance is more (less) likely in the ASYM (UNKNOWN) condition. The 
coefficients of Age and Female remain negative and significant. The coefficient of Income 
is significant, but almost zero. Individuals using written contracts more often are less likely 
to enter into an agreement in the experiment. Being prone to guilt feelings (Guilt score) as 
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according to our test
52
 and a rising risk tolerance are associated with a higher probability of 
acceptance. 
In general, a subject’s earnings and role in the experiment conducted before seem not to 
have a decisive effect on her acceptance decision. In one regression (column (4)), first-
game earnings are significant at the 5-percent level, but the coefficient is very small. We 
are thus optimistic that the first experiment’s impact on contract acceptance is negligible. 
Investment. The second part of Table 4.3 depicts results of probit regressions with Invest-
ment as dependent variable, taking a value of 1 if a subject complied with the agreement 
and 0 otherwise. In column (5) we again only consider the condition dummies, which are 
insignificant. Adding subjects’ age, gender and first-experiment controls in column (6), we 
find that women in our experiment are significantly less likely to invest in quality com-
pared to their male counterparts. Column (7) suggests that this gender difference is not 
significant for all conditions. Yet, for the UNKNOWN condition it is prevalent; here wom-
en are particularly less likely than men to invest in quality. In column (8) we include the 
same demographic, economic and preference variables as for contract acceptance in col-
umn (4). In the ASYM condition, individuals are now more likely to invest relative to the 
SYM. The effect is significant at the 10-percent level (there is no significance for UN-
KNOWN). Age and Female become/remain both negative and significant. Subjects with 
more children are more likely to invest. So are individuals who are married/cohabitating or 
divorced/widowed, relative to singles. Again, the coefficient of income is close to zero, yet 
significant. The frequent use of written contracts in everyday life and a greater (advanta-
geous) inequity aversion decrease the probability of investing. Individuals who think others 
                                                 
52
 This test is based on the Guilt–Negative-Behavior-Evaluation (NBE), which is part of the Guilt and Shame 
Proneness (GASP) score introduced by Cohen et al. (2011). We just adapted the described situations to the 
life of slum dwellers. 
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would try to be fair rather than taking advantage of them (Expect fairness others) and those 
who rated their comprehension with the experimental instructions higher are more likely to 
comply and invest.  
Also for the investment decision, the control for first-experiment earnings (that are not due 
to the role) is insignificant and throughout exhibits very small coefficients. This time, 
however, the role a subject played in the experiment before (principal/agent) becomes sig-
nificant at the 5-percent level, indicating an influence on the investment decision in this 
game. Controlling for the role is thus important and makes us more confident that we esti-
mate the real condition effects. Furthermore and importantly, we can expect the first-game 
roles to influence all conditions the same way as they were assigned randomly to the par-
ticipants and they are distributed equally between (and even within) the conditions. 
4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 Inequity aversion and responses to unfairness 
If subjects were rational and selfish, we should barely observe rejections and investment in 
our experiment. A robust result of this study is that contract acceptance is more likely if 
producers know they will get a smaller share of the pie. This finding sounds less counterin-
tuitive if we recognize that the producer’s absolute payoff is the same in all conditions, 
while the “total pie” in the ASYM becomes much greater. 
Moreover, the fact that the vast majority of producers does invest in quality is surprising. It 
is reasonable to say that opportunism does not prove to be a great problem here. Although 
we control for risk preferences to a certain degree (and the coefficient is insignificant), risk 
aversion is presumably part of the explanation. In general, when making their investment 
decision subjects do not seem to bother much about what the other player earns. Perhaps, 
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these profit asymmetries are all too common in slum dwellers’ daily routine. As an illustra-
tion, compare the mean monthly earnings of KES 4,800 in our sample with an average 
private-sector employee’s income in Kenya of around KES 39,000 (KNBS, 2014). This 
latter figure includes also low-income activities, such as agriculture, mining or waste man-
agement. Taking a closer look at the responses in our post-experimental survey, we find 
support for this hypothesis. In one part subjects were asked to agree/disagree with the 
statement: “Other people should not own much more than I do.” The outcome is depicted 
in Figure 4.1. Accordingly, 83 percent (strongly) disagree with the statement, while not 
even 12 percent (strongly) agree. This distribution of responses suggests that Nairobi slum 
dwellers reveal a very low level of inequity aversion when income or wealth asymmetries 
are to their disadvantage.
53
 This outcome, however, may be primarily driven by the very 
low wealth level in our study population. 
 
Figure 4.1:  Responses to “How much do you agree/disagree with the following statement: Other 
people should not own much more than I do.” 
At large, our results strongly contradict standard-theoretic predictions of vast post-
contractual opportunism, but also do not confirm our intuition of other-regarding prefer-
                                                 
53
 We also confronted subjects with the opposite statement “Other people should not own much less than I 
do”, with which they agreed more (cf. Table 4.2). The difference in responses between the two statements is 
highly significant (p = .0001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). 
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ences or fairness concerns. When controlling for demographic, economic and other varia-
bles, we even find a higher probability of investment in the ASYM condition relative to the 
SYM. Non-transparency with regard to the buyer’s profit (UNKNOWN) makes no consid-
erable difference in post-contractual behavior, confirming that this information seems not 
to be very relevant for the producers. While all this clearly indicates that inequity aversion 
does not explain behavioral patterns in our game, these results are largely in line with other 
studies’ findings that many individuals reveal preferences for social welfare and efficiency. 
Charness and Rabin (2002: 819) claim that “the role of inequality reduction in motivating 
subjects has been exaggerated.” They find that for many individuals increasing social wel-
fare seems more of a matter than decreasing pecuniary differences. This would explain the 
high compliance rates within “unfair” arrangements in our experiment.
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Our results also appear contradictory to many outcomes of other experimental examina-
tions, like rejections in ultimatum or altruistic punishment in cooperation games. Yet, 
again, it is important to bear in mind that we exclude reciprocity as a potential driver of 
behavior, since contract offers and, most of all, profit shares are not a result of the buyer’s 
intention. In a series of simplified ultimatum games, Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) 
show that a responder’s reaction to an unequal allocation strongly depends on the alterna-
tive allocations available to the proposer. That is, “responders take into account not only 
the distributive consequences of the proposer’s action but also the intention signaled by the 
action” (ibid.: 25). Seemingly, behavioral responses to inequality in contractual relations 
are much more a reaction to the intended “unfairness” of the other party than to pure profit 
allocations. This presumption, though, cannot be tested with our data. On the contrary, 
Charness (2004) demonstrates in a gift-exchange experiment with U.S. students that even 
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 The expected total profit in the SYM is almost equal in case of investment (106) and non-investment 
(105). Yet, in the ASYM it is higher when the producer invests (268 vs. 240). 
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though reciprocity plays a crucial role when agents decide about their costly action, there is 
also a positive wage–effort relationship if an external third party or a random device de-
termines the height of the agent’s payment. That is, intentions matter—but so do outcomes. 
4.5.2 Gender differences 
Throughout our analysis we find significant gender effects. We saw that women are less 
likely than men to accept a contract. Furthermore, we show that the gender effect becomes 
very salient in the ASYM condition. Again, acceptance is always rational and comes with-
out risk. At first glance, the gender difference in the ASYM looks like evidence for strong-
er fairness preferences compared to men, but also women have with 93 percent the highest 
acceptance rate in the ASYM (81 percent in the SYM; 74 percent in the UNKNOWN), 
while men accept every single contract in this condition (89 percent in the SYM; 96 per-
cent in the UNKNOWN). Also the survey results do not lend support to the presumption 
that females dislike inequity more than men do (Figure 4.1; responses between women and 
men not different, p = 0.4724, Mann–Whitney U test). Women appear a bit more reluctant 
to enter a relationship altogether—yet on a very high general level. 
Furthermore, women are somewhat less likely to invest. According to our regression anal-
ysis, the gender difference this time is pronounced in the UNKNOWN. This seems to be 
driven by a very high investment rate of male subjects in this condition, however. While 
women chose to invest in 88 percent of all possible cases in the UNKNOWN (90 percent 
in the SYM; 85 percent in the ASYM), again, men in this condition always invested (87 
percent in the SYM; 95 percent in the ASYM). 
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4.5.3 Concluding remarks 
Following standard theoretic predictions, opportunistic behavior should be a severe prob-
lem in our simple principal–agent experiment. This proves wrong, however, as the vast 
majority of producers honor the agreement and invest in quality. Theories of fairness and 
inequ(al)ity aversion extend the standard model of behavior and assume that individuals 
dislike unequal outcomes. Again, we cannot find evidence that producers’ behavior is more 
opportunistic when differences in payoffs between the contracting parties are large. A 
plausible reason is that Nairobi slum dwellers exhibit a rather low level of inequity aver-
sion (at least when the reference player is a peer slum resident). 
Even though newer studies put parsimonious theories of inequity aversion into perspective 
and stress the role of fairness intentions, negative reciprocity and concerns for social wel-
fare (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; ibid., 2008), there 
is long-standing evidence that individuals do not like earning less than others and respond 
to disadvantageous inequality—even if this response is costly (see Clark and D’Ambrosio, 
2015 for a recent review). Charness (2004) suggests that, albeit reciprocity is indeed essen-
tial in contractual relations, agents’ decisions are influenced by outcomes that are deter-
mined randomly or by a third party. Our results from urban slum dwellers are at odds with 
this intuition. To this end, more research is required to truly explore other-regarding pref-
erences and consequent economic conduct of the poor. These preferences appear to be dif-
ferent from those revealed by students in industrial countries. 
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Appendix 4A: Producers’ investment decision and the theory of inequity aversion 
In this appendix, we formally analyze the opportunistic/compliance behavior of inequity-
averse producers. The general theory of inequity aversion (or fairness), as developed by 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), assumes that an individual’s utility function is not merely influ-
enced by her own pecuniary outcome, but also by that of other players and the resulting 
difference in payoffs. Thereby, a player experiences a utility loss from both, disadvanta-
geous inequality (being behind) and advantageous inequality (being ahead). Due to the 
design of our experiment we can simplify and only consider the two-player case. Analo-
gously to the Fehr–Schmidt model, we denote the producer’s monetary payoff 𝑥𝑃 and the 
buyer’s monetary payoff 𝑥𝐵. The producer’s utility function is given by 
𝑢𝑃(𝑥𝑃, 𝑥𝐵) = 𝑥𝑃 − 𝛼𝑃 max 𝑥𝐵−𝑥𝑃, 0 − 𝛽𝑃 max 𝑥𝑃−𝑥𝐵, 0 . 
For the three possible situations that (i) both players’ payoffs are equal, (ii) the producer is 
behind in monetary terms, and (iii) the producer is ahead, this gives us 
 
                  𝑢𝑃(𝑥𝑃 , 𝑥𝐵) = 
 
where 𝛼𝑃 is a measure of the producer’s utility loss from disadvantageous inequality and 
𝛽𝑃 weights her loss from advantageous inequality with 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑃 < 1 and 𝛽𝑃 ≤ 𝛼𝑃. If an 
individual is entirely selfish, i.e., 𝛽𝑃 = 𝛼𝑃 = 0, we obtain the usual 𝑢𝑃(𝑥𝑃) = 𝑥𝑃. 
As our experiment is not about distributional preferences with regard to a known surplus 
but features a stochastic outcome, we have to make use of expected payoffs. Since we 
𝑥𝑃 
(1 + 𝛼𝑃)𝑥𝑃 − 𝛼𝑃𝑥𝐵 
(1 − 𝛽𝑃)𝑥𝑃 + 𝛽𝑃𝑥𝐵 
, 𝑥𝑃 = 𝑥𝐵 
, 𝑥𝑃 < 𝑥𝐵 




4. Do inequalities in profit reinforce post-contractual opportunism? 
  
121 
know the probabilities of a quality outcome contingent on whether or not the producer in-
vested, we can substitute the expected payoffs in equation (4A.1) above and get 
 
  𝐸(𝑢𝑃) = 
 
Now, we first look at the ASYM condition where we set 𝜑 = 240 and get 
 
                              𝐸(𝑢𝑃)𝐴𝑆𝑌𝑀 = 
 
Independently of the (positive) value of 𝛼𝑃, the producer always has a higher utility when 
breaching the contract and refraining from investing. 
In the SYM condition, the scenario is somewhat different. Here, the producer is again 
slightly behind the buyer in expected values when investing, but ahead when not investing. 
For 𝜑 = 60 we get 
 
                                𝐸(𝑢𝑃)𝑆𝑌𝑀 = 
 
Conditional on the individual’s value of 𝛼𝑃 and 𝛽𝑃, a shift towards contract compliance is 
now generally possible if 
 
 
60 − 𝛼𝑃 max 0.75𝜑 − 60, 0 − 𝛽𝑃 max 60 − 0.75𝜑, 0  
52 − 𝛼𝑃 max 0.9𝜑 − 52, 0 − 𝛽𝑃 max 52 − 0.9𝜑, 0  
, 𝑖 = 0 
, 𝑖 = 1. 
 
60 − 120𝛼𝑃 
52 − 164𝛼𝑃 
, 𝑖 = 0 
, 𝑖 = 1. 
 
60 − 15𝛽𝑃 
52 − 2𝛼𝑃 
, 𝑖 = 0 
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Therefore, if we exemplarily assume that 𝛼𝑃 = 1 and 𝛽𝑃 = 0.7, then a rational but inequi-
ty-averse producer would decide to comply with the contract. If, say, 𝛼𝑃 = 2 and 𝛽𝑃 =
0.8, then a producer were indifferent between investment and non-investment. Recall that 
the Fehr–Schmidt model assumes that 𝛽𝑃 is positive, strictly smaller than 1, and not larger 
than 𝛼𝑃. 
Producers who sufficiently dislike being ahead thus potentially shift from non-investment 
to investment. This formal argument supports the presumption that we observe more op-
portunism in the ASYM relative to the SYM (and UNKNOWN) condition. However, it 
should not be confused with our second (non-formal) “fairness argument” that subjects 
start out with the intention to invest—because, e.g., guilt feelings make them comply—but 
switch to non-investment in the ASYM condition as they feel treated unfairly. 
We should sound a note of caution, however. Even though the formal argument of a poten-
tial switch to compliance in the SYM holds true mathematically, the 𝛽𝑃 required for this 
switch is rather large. That is, a subject must greatly dislike being ahead—even by a bit. 
The largest 𝛽𝑖 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) but also Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007) assume is 
0.6. If we maintain the assumption of 𝛽𝑃 ≤ 𝛼𝑃, no switch in our game is predicted with 
this value of 𝛽𝑃.  
The question arising from the outcome of this study and in particular the questionnaire is 
whether the assumption of 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 is a reasonable one and adequately describes most of 
our slum population’s social preferences. Future research should tackle this question more 
rigorously as the answer could have substantial theoretical and practical implications. 
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We will now play a short game in which you can earn real money. How much you earn also de-
pends on your own decisions. Please do not talk to other participants and keep your phone switched 
off until the end of the session. 
In this game, imagine you are the Producer of a product. You can choose to enter an agreement 
with a Buyer, to produce and later sell your product to him. The Buyer wants a high quality and, 
thus, that you invest in this quality. The investment is costly for you, but if you invest, the chances 
for high quality are better than without investment. Both, you and the Buyer earn more with a high 
than a low quality product. 
There is only one Buyer sitting in this room. All other people are Producers. That means, all Pro-
ducers who accept an agreement sell their product to the same person. This one Buyer will be in-
formed about his role at the beginning of the game. 
 
The decisions 
The game consists of the following decisions: 
1. Acceptance: You decide if you accept the Buyer’s offer to produce and later sell a product 
to him. If you do not accept this offer, you and the Buyer earn KSh 20 each, and the game 
is over. If you accept, you promise the Buyer that you will invest in a high quality of the 
product. 
2. Investment: If you accepted the offer, you now decide if you want to invest in the product’s 
quality. The Buyer cannot observe if you really invested, he only observes the quality of 
the product. The investment costs you KSh 20 (no investment costs you nothing). 
3. Quality: The computer now sets the quality of the product. The chances for high quality are  
80 % if you made the investment, and 50 % if you did not make the investment. 
  
High and low quality 
The chances for a high quality product are better if you decided to invest (80 % compared to 50 %). 
For a better understanding of these chances, consider the following two images of bags, each con-
taining ten balls [ handout]. Green balls represent high quality and red balls low quality. 
                                                 
*
 This material refers to the ASYM condition. For the other conditions only relevant elements changed (e.g., 
the buyer’s payoff), everything else remained the same. Translated to Swahili, the instructions were read 
aloud to the participants while they received an English handout (see below) with important elements of the 
game. Comprehension questions had to be answered using the computer, giving participants an immediate 
feedback; as the screen was locked following a wrong answer, pure guesswork was impossible. The Swahili 
instructions and the material of the other conditions will be provided upon request. 
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Imagine you draw a ball from one bag without looking. If you invested, you are drawing from the 







You and the Buyer will earn the following points with an agreement. Please make sure you under-
stand the different profits before taking your decisions. 
 High quality:  You earn KSh 80 (minus the cost of 20 if you invested), 
the Buyer earns KSh 240  
 Low quality:  You earn KSh 40 (minus the cost of 20 if you invested), 
the Buyer earns KSh 120  
This amount will be added to the money you earned so far for your participation and transferred to 
your cellphone via mPESA after this session.  
Let’s discuss the Buyer’s payment: As he is interacting with different players, he only earns the 
points from interaction with one of the Producers. By chance, the computer picks the one trade for 
the Buyer’s payment. That means, the Buyer will earn KSh 20, 120 or 240, depending on your 
decisions and the quality of the product. He will not earn the sum of all trades! 
This game will only be played for one single round. Consequently, you make the decisions only 
once. Please take your time to decide carefully. 
The one person in this room who represents the Buyer will be informed by a message on the 
screen. The Buyer does not take any decisions, but only observes his profit. 
No one will get to know your identity or the identity of the Buyer. All your decisions are made 
completely anonymously. 
The illustration [ handout] summarizes the different decisions and earnings. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
  
with investment without investment 
 










Please answer the following questions. They are only meant to support your understanding of 
the game and will not directly influence your payment. 
 
 
1. How many rounds is the game played for? 2 4 3 5 1 
 
2. If you as a Producer invest, how big are the 
chances that the product is of high quality? 
50 % 0 % 30 % 100 % 80 % 
 
3. If you as a Producer do NOT invest, how big 
are the chances that the product is of high quali-
ty? 
80 % 50 % 0 % 100 % 10 % 
 
4. With accepting an agreement, do you promise 
the Buyer to invest? 
Yes No 
 




6. How much will an investment cost you? KSh 20 Nothing 
 
7. How much will you earn if you invest and the 
quality is high? 
KSh 60 KSh 80 
 
8. How much will the Buyer earn if the quality is 
high? 
The same (KSh 60) KSh 240 
 
9. How many Buyers are sitting in this room? 10 1 
 
10. Will the Buyer earn the money from ALL 
trades or only from ONE of the trades? 
Money from  
ALL trades 
Money from ONE 










In the preceding chapters, we presented three experimental studies of contracting and se-
quential exchange in situations where neither party can rely on formal external enforce-
ment. In what follows, we will summarize our main findings and provide some cautious 
implications for real-world relationships and institutions. Moreover, we discuss the studies’ 
limitations and derive suggestions for future research. 
5.1 Summary and implications 
5.1.1 Chapter 2 
In a laboratory experiment we study behavior in a novel contract farming game. Two play-
ers were able to conclude a contract, but both could also breach it ex post by side-selling to 
an external “spot market” (farmer player) or reducing the price paid for the delivered pro-
duce (company player). 
We find that long-term relations improve cooperation and compliance, but do not lead to 
proper self-enforcement and satisfying private ordering in most cases. This holds true, even 
though we can show that cooperation would pay off in the long run, as demonstrated by the 
significantly higher profit for individuals in well-functioning dyads. Voluntary free-form 
communication to bargain terms directly or communicate discontent does not improve re-
lations and was often expected to be mere cheap talk (and therefore not executed). This 
stands in sharp contrast to the impact of communication found in other bargaining or prin-
cipal–agent experiments (Charness, 2012). Company players understand that they can ex-





higher contract prices in the condition without private enforcement. Yet, we also show that 
these price premiums are only “allurements” and actually paid prices are lower compared 
to the other conditions. 
Previous experimental research suggests that markets witness a strong “bilateralization” if 
third-party enforcement is absent (Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004; Fehr, Brown and Zehnder, 
2009). That is, traders commit themselves to long-term dyads that become dominant rela-
tive to anonymous spot market interactions. Our study—featuring a more specific setting—
reveals that long-term relations per se have a disciplining effect as opposed to one-shot 
interactions. This holds, even if a party cannot choose among many potential trading part-
ners in a market—as would be ideal, but is often not the case in economies with high trans-
action costs and poor information (McMillan and Woodruff, 2000). For real-world ex-
change, the accumulation of (bilateral) reputation capital can thus improve the outcome. 
While this repeated game effect has also been observed in similar settings, our results are 
more informative with respect to what happens within these partnerships:  
First, the sequence of actions and the power relation between contracting parties play a 
crucial role. In our experiment, the first- and last-moving company player was able to skim 
off the surplus from private enforcement. Relatedly, we found that price reductions by the 
company are more frequent than (predicted) side-selling. Remaining in the realm of con-
tract agriculture, producer organizations could represent an institutional solution to these 
problems by constituting an intermediary between seller and buyer (Minot, 2007). If op-
portunistic price reductions arise from the buyer’s non-transparent quality control, the pos-
sibility for external quality checks to remove information asymmetries can increase farm-
ers’ effort and investment (Sänger, Torero and Qaim, 2014) and potentially reduce side-





Second, the finding that long-term benefits of well-functioning relations do not make most 
contracts readily self-enforcing points towards the vulnerability of private enforcement 
under dysfunctional public order. Here, external private institutions can provide infor-
mation about the fact that breach, albeit tempting in a specific moment, is likely to cause 
mutual losses in the long run. Whether this information makes a difference or is, similar to 
our voluntary communication, only cheap talk must be investigated empirically. In coun-
tries with a reasonable judicial system, small-claims courts can support parties to credibly 
threat with legal consequences. Even so, long-term relations and reputation will remain 
central means for diminishing transaction costs. 
5.1.2 Chapter 3 
This study originates from the notion that contract flexibility can be advantageous or even 
necessary for trade in very hazardous environments, where information on the reason of 
breach is usually asymmetric. Empirical research in sub-Saharan Africa (Bigsten et al., 
2000; Fafchamps, 2004) demonstrates that exchange in developing countries exhibits a 
high degree of flexibility. With observational data, however, it is hardly possible to link 
this finding directly to the actual existence or extent of risk. To the best of our knowledge, 
we present the first controlled study with subjects from a low-income country that investi-
gates preferences for contract flexibility. For this purpose, we introduce an adjusted in-
vestment game with two different agreements and hidden knowledge. The experiment is 
conducted with urban slum dwellers in Nairobi. 
We confirm the existence of strong preferences for flexibility; two out of three offered con-
tracts are flexible. Principals are more likely to offer flexible agreements in the high-risk 





facing the risk of a productivity shock, as they fear harsh retaliation when experiencing a 
bad state and not returning anything. They show, however, no particular reluctance to sign 
a rigid contract when risk is high. 
In addition, our results indicate that flexible contracts more often allow for a return of more 
than zero, but also encourage opportunistic behavior and returns of less than the agreed 
amount. A good state is generally associated with a (slightly) higher repayment. When they 
mean to interact, principals are always better off opting for a rigid agreement. This also 
holds true in the high-risk environment. At the same time, rigid contracts lead to consider-
able welfare losses owing to extensive retaliation. 
For real-world exchange in environments with high risk and ambiguity, our study suggests 
that the strong preferences for flexibility should be taken into account. Formal contracts, 
but also implicit agreements, ought to leave space for ex post adjustments and excusable 
breach. Nevertheless, flexibility should not be confused with full discretion. We reasoned 
why we decide for this extreme form in our experiment. Opportunism and the abuse of 
flexibility must be discouraged either by a lower level of total discretion for the agent or by 
the formation of long-term relationships. Fafchamps (1996) proposes to limit the number 
of times the principal is willing to accept a deviation from the original contract terms.
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Existing or emerging institutions should rather aim at solving the information problems 
than to rigidly enforce all contracts. The ignorance of these preferences for flexibility 
would lead to potential welfare losses. First, resources are wasted by means of retaliation 
(usually a lose–lose situation) and, second, the reluctance to trade entails unexploited wel-
fare opportunities. We agree with Fafchamps’ conclusion that “contractual flexibility is 
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 He illustrates this situation with Aesop’s tale of the shepherd boy who cried “wolf” too many times to fool 
his fellow villagers. When a real wolf appears and the boy cries again, nobody believes and comes to support 





necessary and will continue to be. […] No new institution can—or should try to—
eliminate noncompliance altogether” (2004: 460). 
5.1.3 Chapter 4 
In this study we argue that, despite the severe poverty that undeniably exists, slums are not 
the idle places many people imagine them to be. Instead, they are environments of lively 
economic interaction. Understanding dwellers’ behavior in exchange relationships is thus 
important to extend our knowledge of markets and value chains in developing countries, 
but also to shape their framework conditions.  
Our study is among the few controlled examinations of slum dweller’s other-regarding 
behavior. With residents from the Kibera slum in Nairobi, we study agents’ conduct in a 
simple principal–agent setting with hidden action. In particular, we are interested in the 
effect of the principal’s profit from the contract (or, more precisely, the agent’s infor-
mation about it). Behavior and other-regarding preferences are likely to differ from what 
was found in former studies, as (1) we exclude reciprocity as a driving force and look at 
given distributions, (2) slum dwellers are familiar with missing formal institutions for en-
forcement and protection, and (3) they witness tremendous inequalities in wealth and in-
come on a daily basis. 
We find a very low level of post-contractual opportunism and no pronounced differences 
between various profit ratios (symmetric, asymmetric or unknown). This neither confirms 
predictions by the self-interest model nor a determinative role of fairness concerns. To-
gether with our survey results, this suggests a fairly low level of inequity aversion among 
Nairobi slum dwellers. Even though there is convincing evidence that reactions to unequal 





party (Charness, 2004; Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; ibid., 2008), the same studies 
show that individuals dislike to be worse off even if their share is generated randomly or 
by a third party. We do not find support for this intuition. A cautious implication from our 
results could hence be that costly monitoring and control may be less necessary than stand-
ard theory makes us believe. At least we cannot report an increase in opportunism simply 
based on envy, even when actions are hidden. Thus, inefficiencies in value chains and 
moral hazard in working relations in developing countries are not readily becoming more 
severe because there are perceived differences in profit. 
To sound a note of caution, the lack of reaction to inequality in our principal–agent setting 
is a result that cannot be generalized yet (see also critique by Güth, Kliemt and Levati, 
2009). Instead, more research is required to profoundly understand slum dwellers’ other-
regarding preferences. This is important not only to further test related theories, but also 
for more practical purposes. First, social preferences have been proven to influence “real” 
economic outcomes (Carpenter and Seki, 2011; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). Second, they 
are likely to have critical implications for the design of institutions or aid programs in de-
veloping countries and slums in particular. Who should benefit first from scarce resources? 
How is redistribution perceived? Which contracts provide adequate incentives? What kind 
or extend of inequity in wealth starts to become a threat to social peace? This small exper-
iment cannot answer these larger questions—but it can motivate further research along 
these lines. 
5.2 Limitations and scope for future research 
The five points of criticism towards economic (lab) experiments that were briefly men-





with an artificial setting that ignores important elements of reality. This, however, is inevi-
table and the cost we pay for solving identification problems and obtaining a high level of 
control. The remuneration of subjects contingent on their decisions in the experiment and 
the use of framing (Chapter 2) make us optimistic that we created dilemmas individuals 
would also face in the real world outside the laboratory. Nonetheless, the extent of external 
validity in laboratory (or lab-like field) experiments is always a critical issue. 
Second, the subject pools we use are not representative. This is particularly obvious for the 
contribution in Chapter 2. There are two main intuitions why students might behave differ-
ently compared to a random sample drawn from the whole population: They are more edu-
cated and younger. While using student subjects is common practice in experimental eco-
nomics and psychology, there is evidence that their level of cooperative behavior and trust 
is lower (Gächter, Herrmann and Thöni, 2004). Additionally, strong behavioral differences 
between cultures exist (Henrich et al., 2001). 
Third, as in most experiments stakes are rather small. We endeavored, however, to cover 
most participants’ opportunity cost of time. Several studies cannot confirm significant be-
havioral changes in games were more money was at stake (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). 
Fourth, while we ensured that there are sufficient numbers of subjects and observations in 
each experiment, there are only few truly independent observations. When analyzing our 
data, we follow seminal experimental papers in their application of statistical and econo-
metric methods and use non-parametric tests or regression analysis with controlling for 
time trends and cluster-correlated standard errors. 
And finally, we cannot entirely rule out self-selection into the experiments and subject 





quately large and access is easy. For the study in Chapter 2, we randomly recruited partici-
pants from a university subject pool where everyone is free to register online. The Kibera 
pool contains about 2,500 registered individuals—not counting those from other slums or 
the Nairobi University. The Busara Center frequently extends the pool; requirements for 
slum dwellers are low (e.g., they do not have to possess an ID card or be able to read) and 
registration is done in the slum by field officers (see Haushofer et al., 2014 for details). 
Only invited participants were allowed to attend our experiments. 
Where to go from here?  
Several potential paths of future research were addressed in the preceding chapters. As 
experimental research comes with the great advantage of replicability, we encourage 
scholars to carry out extensions and robustness checks of the experiments presented in this 
dissertation. Regarding the study in Chapter 2, it would be interesting to see whether the 
results are sensitive to a change in the framing or whether “tying the hands” of the compa-
ny player and policing the payment process leads to a great rise in the number of well-
functioning relations. But also a first lab-test of other potential private-order mechanisms 
can generate interesting findings. For real-world contract farming these investigations 
eventually need to be conducted in the field. 
Our examination of contract flexibility (Chapter 3) can be enhanced running sessions with 
different degrees of flexibility or a different study population in which flexible agreements 
play a crucial role (business owners, smallholder farmers). Limiting the agent’s discretion 
or number of times she is allowed to defect would be an interesting variation. Three as-
pects mentioned in the conclusion of Chapter 3 should be investigated, namely, long-term 





In addition, slum dwellers’ other-regarding behavior and social preferences in exchange 
relationships must be further explored to properly understand markets and sequential ex-
change in developing countries. As we are only looking at inequalities in profits that are 
exogenously determined and not a result of the buyer’s intention (Chapter 4), this should 
be included in future experiments to allow for reciprocal responses. 
In general, behavior in contractual relations is likely to remain a fruitful research topic. The 
psychological foundations of contracts and how they influence (or are influenced by) pref-
erences must be identified and investigated more profoundly (Kőszegi, 2014); but also how 
institutions and informal mechanisms for contract enforcement should be designed in order 
to provide the right incentives. At this, considering the context of a specific country, cul-
tural peculiarities and societal norms that interact with individuals’ behavior, preferences 
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